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Executive summary 
• Over the years since its foundation in 1919, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has developed a 
comprehensive framework of minimum labour standards. During the 1990s, with the acceleration of 
globalisation and its associated competitive and economic pressures on labour markets, the ILO sought to 
reinvigorate its agenda. It did this by focusing on the implementation of what it identified as ‘fundamental’ 
conventions and their associated ‘core’ labour standards, and by promoting the concept of ‘decent work’. It 
aimed to ensure that economic progress went hand in hand with social progress and was not achieved at the 
expense of fundamental human rights.  
• The core standards identified by the ILO relate to the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labour, the abolition of child labour, freedom of association and recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining, the elimination of any discrimination in employment and occupation, and the recognition of 
equal remuneration for work of equal value. 
• Australia has been a foundation and active member of the ILO. It encountered some compliance issues prior 
to 1996. However, the passage of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Workplace Relations Act) and the 
further reforms implemented by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 resulted in 
significantly increased concerns for Australia’s compliance with its international obligations under the 
ILO’s fundamental conventions. Since 1997, there has been an ongoing process of dialogue between the 
Australian Government and the ILO’s supervisory bodies over compliance issues. 
• The ILO’s supervisory bodies have been concerned that Australia’s efforts to protect freedom of association 
and encourage and promote collective bargaining (Conventions Nos. 87 and 98) fall short of the standards 
required by these fundamental conventions. The lack of progress towards equal remuneration has also been 
a concern. More specifically, aspects of the Workplace Relations Act which have given rise to concerns are 
those provisions which: give primacy to individual over collective forms of agreement; restrict the level at 
which bargaining can occur; limit what may be included in a collective agreement; raise the potential for 
anti-union discrimination; place limitations on trade unions’ rights to organise; and impose limits on strike 
action beyond those envisaged by Convention No. 87.  
• The paper outlines the ILO’s concerns and examines future prospects, including by assessing relevant 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) and Australian Greens’ policy commitments. It concludes that while not 
without compliance issues, the ALP policy would appear to address a significant number of key areas of 
concern. The Greens’ policy commitments suggest that they will seek to pressure the Labor Government to 
address the remaining areas of concern in relation to international obligations. 
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Introduction 
Australia does not have a bill of rights, but it has ratified a range of major international 
covenants and conventions which have been designed to provide a system of protection of 
fundamental human rights and standards.1 These include international labour standards 
developed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and its member states to protect 
and promote rights at work. These standards provide a comprehensive range of labour 
obligations and binding international legal commitments.  
This paper outlines the role of the ILO and its supervisory bodies in the development and 
implementation of international labour standards. It notes the continuing attempts of the ILO 
to refocus the attention of its member states on the adoption and implementation of a set of 
fundamental conventions and core labour standards in the context of the pressures of 
globalisation. It examines the ILO’s concerns for the impact of the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Workplace Relations Act) on Australia’s compliance with core labour standards. It also 
considers future prospects, including the potential for the Rudd Labor Government to address 
compliance issues. 
Background 
Foundation of the ILO 
The ILO was founded in 1919, in the wake of the First World War. In 1919, the achievement 
of social justice was seen as an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of world peace. The 
ILO was entrusted with working towards this objective and was given the task of adopting 
international labour standards as its principal means of action. This vision was set out in the 
preamble to the ILO’s constitution, which also identified priorities in carrying out this 
program: 
… conditions of labour exist involving such injustice hardship and privation to large 
numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are 
imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required; as, for example, by 
the regulation of the hours of work including the establishment of a maximum working day 
and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the 
provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease 
and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and 
women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when 
employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of equal 
 
1.  For further detail see H. Charlesworth, ‘A Bill of Rights: An end to our solitude’, in Time for 
change: Australia in the 21st century, T. Wright (ed.), Hardie Grant Books, Victoria, 2006, pp. 
217–236. 
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remuneration for work of equal value, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, 
the organisation of vocational and technical education and other measures.2 
In 1944, the ILO Conference adopted the Declaration of Philadelphia, which was 
subsequently incorporated into the ILO’s constitution. Importantly for the work of the ILO, 
the Declaration established the principle of the primacy of social objectives over those of 
economic policy and marked a shift in emphasis to the protection of fundamental rights of the 
individual. It made the ILO responsible for promoting basic human rights in the workplace, 
including the principle that: 
… all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their 
material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of 
economic security and equal opportunity … it is the responsibility of the International 
Labour Organisation to examine and consider all international and fiscal policies and 
measures in the light of this fundamental objective.3 
Originally part of the League of Nations, the ILO became an agency of the United Nations 
(UN) in 1946.  
How the ILO works4 
The ILO is the only tripartite UN agency. It brings together representatives of governments, 
employers and workers to shape its policies and programmes. The ILO considers that this 
arrangement allows it to incorporate practical knowledge about employment and work into its 
agenda and outputs. 
The member states of the ILO meet at the International Labour Conference in June of each 
year, in Geneva. Two government delegates, an employer delegate and a worker delegate 
represent each member state. Technical advisors assist the delegations, which are usually 
headed by Cabinet Ministers who take the floor on behalf of their governments.  
                                                 
2.  Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, 1919. Also see 
M.Humblet and M. Zarka-Martres, ‘ILO standards policy’, in International Labour Office, 
International labour standards: a global approach, 1st edn., Geneva, 2001, pp. 1–15. 
3. ‘Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation’ 
(Declaration of Philadelphia), contained in the Annex to Constitution of the International 
Labour Organisation, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloconst.htm, accessed 25/9/2007. 
4.  This section is largely based on information available on the ILO’s website. For further 
information about how the ILO works, see International Labour Organisation, ‘About the ILO’, 
http://www.ilo.org, accessed 7/9/2007; and International Labour Office, Rules of the game: a 
brief introduction to international labour standards, Geneva, 2005. For further information see 
B. Creighton and A. Stewart, Labour law: An introduction, 4th edn., Federation Press, Sydney, 
2005, pp. 66–73. 
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The Governing Body is the executive council of the ILO and meets three times a year in 
Geneva. It comprises 56 members, of whom 28 represent governments, 14 represent workers 
and 14 represent employers. Ten of the 28 government seats are reserved for the states of 
‘chief industrial importance’.5 The Governing Body takes decisions on ILO policy and 
establishes the programme and the budget, which it then submits to the Conference for 
adoption. 
The International Labour Office is the administrative arm of the ILO. It is headed by the 
Director General who is elected by the Governing Body for a renewable term of five years. 
The Office is answerable to the Governing Body through the Director General. 
Creating international labour standards  
The ILO formulates instruments that set minimum standards for basic labour rights. These 
instruments are generally conventions, which are legally binding international treaties that 
may be ratified by member states. However, the ILO also uses other mechanisms to establish 
important standards or principles, such as declarations adopted by its conference (for 
example, the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, and the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work). 
The ILO also formulates recommendations, which serve as non-binding guidelines that 
complement its conventions. 
International labour standards generally result from international concern that action needs to 
be taken on a particular issue. As a first step, the Governing Body agrees to put an issue on 
the agenda of a future International Labour Conference. The International Labour Office then 
prepares a report that analyses the laws and practices of member states with regard to the 
issue. The report is circulated to member states and to workers’ and employers’ organisations 
for comment and is discussed at the International Labour Conference. A second report is then 
prepared by the Office with a draft instrument for comment and submitted for discussion at 
the following Conference, where the draft is amended as necessary and proposed for 
adoption. This double discussion process gives Conference participants time to examine the 
draft instrument and provide comments.  
A two-thirds majority of votes by delegates is required for an international labour standard to 
be adopted. This has a number of benefits, as Creighton and Stewart note. It means that: 
… a standard cannot be adopted in the face of concerted opposition from government 
delegates. It also means that a standard is unlikely to be adopted in the face of the concerted 
opposition of employer or union delegates … This sometimes means that standards which 
are adopted represent the ‘lowest common denominator’ … On the other hand, it also means 
                                                 
5.  Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Article 7. 
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that those standards which are adopted have a unique authority by virtue of the fact that they 
have received a significant measure of acceptance with all three constituencies.6 
In 2003, the ILO began using an integrated approach to improve the coherence, relevance and 
impact of its standards-related activities. This approach involves developing a plan of action, 
including a package of tools to address a specific subject. These tools may include 
conventions, recommendations and other types of instruments, promotional measures, 
technical assistance, research, dissemination of knowledge and inter-agency cooperation.  
The application of international labour standards 
ILO member states are required to submit any convention adopted at the International Labour 
Conference to their national competent authority(s)—generally their parliament(s)—for the 
enactment of relevant legislation or other action, including ratification. They are required to 
do this: 
 … within the period of one year at most from the closing of the session of the Conference, 
or if it is impossible owing to circumstances to do so within the period of one year, then at 
the earliest practicable moment and no later than 18 months from the closing of the session 
of the Conference …’7  
If the member state does not obtain the consent of the competent authority (or authorities), 
then no further obligation rests on the member except in relation to reporting requirements.8 
Ratified conventions become binding one year after the date of ratification, and remain 
binding until denounced under established procedures. Ratification is a formal procedure 
whereby a state accepts the convention as a legally binding instrument. Ratified conventions 
have the effect of a treaty in international law. Ratification obliges the country concerned to 
maintain its law and practice in conformity with the convention. Once it has ratified a 
convention, a country is subject to the ILO’s regular supervisory system responsible for 
ensuring that the convention is applied.  
Most of the ILO’s standards are drafted with provision for some flexibility in their 
application—recognising the considerable diversity of member nations’ cultural, legal and 
institutional arrangements and stages of development. For example, standards on minimum 
wages do not require member states to set a specific minimum wage, but to establish a system 
and the machinery to determine minimum wage rates appropriate to their economic 
development. Other standards include flexibility clauses allowing states to lay down 
temporary standards that are lower than those normally prescribed, to exclude certain 
categories of workers from the application of a convention, or to apply only certain parts of 
the instrument. Ratifying countries are usually required to make a declaration to the Director 
                                                 
6.  ibid., p. 68. 
7.  Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Article 19(5)(b). 
8.  ibid., Article 19(5)(e). 
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General of the ILO if they exercise any of the flexibility options, and to make use of such 
clauses only in consultation with the social partners (that is, representatives of employers and 
workers).  
The supervision of international labour standards 
Member states are required to report to the ILO on the measures they have taken to give 
effect to ratified conventions, according to the type of instrument and the schedule notified by 
the International Labour Office. 
Every two years governments must submit reports detailing the steps they have taken in law 
and practice to apply any of the eight fundamental and four priority conventions9 that they 
have ratified. For all other conventions, reports must be submitted every five years; except for 
conventions that have been shelved (these are no longer supervised on a regular basis). 
Reports on the application of conventions may also be requested at shorter intervals. In 
addition, each year a general survey is conducted on one or more conventions or 
recommendations relating to a particular subject and all member states are required to report, 
irrespective of whether they have ratified the instruments concerned. Representative worker 
and employer organisations have the opportunity to comment before government reports are 
sent to the ILO. 
Conventions are not only of influence in the countries where they have been ratified. 
Governments that have not ratified conventions may use them as guidance when developing 
their labour legislation. Member states also have an obligation to report on unratified 
conventions at appropriate intervals as requested by the Governing Body. Representative 
worker and employer organisations have the opportunity to comment on these reports. A 
streamlined annual reporting process applies to any of the fundamental conventions that 
governments have not ratified.10 
The ILO’s supervisory bodies—the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (Committee of Experts or CEACR) and the Conference Committee on 
the Application of Standards (CCAS)—regularly examine these reports to assess the 
application of standards in member states. The Governing Body is also empowered to require 
member states to report on the obstacles preventing or delaying ratification of nominated 
conventions. 
                                                 
9.  Fundamental and priority conventions are defined in the following section. 
10.  Reporting requirements for the fundamental conventions were defined in ILO, Declaration on 
fundamental principles and rights at work and its follow-up, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pa
gename=DECLARATIONFOLLOWUP , accessed 25/9/2007. 
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The Committee of Experts is composed of 20 eminent jurists appointed by the Governing 
body for three-year terms. Its role is to provide an impartial and technical evaluation of the 
state of application of the ILO’s standards.11 
The annual report of the Committee of Experts, usually adopted in December, is submitted to 
the International Labour Conference the following June, where it is examined by the 
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards. The Conference Committee is a 
standing committee of the Conference and is made up of government, employer and worker 
delegates. It examines the Committee of Experts’ report, selects observations for discussion 
and may invite governments referred to in the report to respond before the Conference 
Committee. 
If there are any problems in the application of standards, the ILO generally seeks to assist 
countries through dialogue with the government concerned, as well as providing advice and 
technical assistance. In this context, dialogue between the ILO and the government concerned 
may involve ‘direct requests’ or ‘observations’. 
The Committee of Experts often makes unpublished direct requests to governments, pointing 
to apparent problems in the application of a standard and giving the country concerned time 
to respond and tackle these issues.12  
Observations are assessments of a government’s compliance with a convention, which are 
published in the report of the Committee of Experts. They generally only occur when the 
Committee is not satisfied with the progress of the closed process of dialogue through direct 
requests. It should be noted that observations are not legal determinations and are not finally 
binding. Only the International Court of Justice can provide a definitive view of the meaning 
of a convention. However, observations are authoritative in the sense that they represent the 
considered views of a panel of eminent jurists elected for the purpose of providing an 
impartial, technical evaluation of the application of the ILO’s conventions. The reports of the 
Committee of Experts provide the basis for discussion at the Conference Committee on the 
Application of Standards. 
Representation and complaint procedures can also be initiated for states that fail to comply 
with conventions they have ratified. 
Representations may be made by organisations of employers or workers. The Governing 
Body decides whether or not to receive a representation. Where appropriate, a representation 
                                                 
11.  For some years, the Chair of the Committee has been Justice Robyn Layton of the South 
Australian Supreme Court. 
12.  Note that the distinction between published and unpublished direct requests has been breaking 
down with the advent of the Internet. While requests are not published in the ILO’s hard copy 
reports, information on direct requests is now available through the ILO’s Database of 
International Labour Standards (ILOLEX) on its website (http://www.ilo.org/iloex), accessed 
20/9/2007. 
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may be referred to the Committee on Freedom of Association, or it may be examined by a 
tripartite committee of the Governing Body and result in a published report of the 
committee’s assessment of compliance. The Governing Body will make findings and may 
decide to pass such a report to the Committee of Experts for follow-up. The Governing Body 
can also establish a Commission of Inquiry to deal with the matter as a complaint.  
Complaints may be filed by member states that have ratified the relevant convention, or by a 
delegate to the Conference, or be referred by the Governing Body (as above). Where 
complaints concern trade union rights, they may be referred to the Committee on Freedom of 
Association. Complaints are generally investigated by a Commission of Inquiry, conducted 
by a panel of eminent jurists. Where a Commission of Inquiry is held, the ILO publishes its 
report and the government can either accept the recommendations, or appeal to the 
International Court of Justice. Where a member state fails to carry out recommendations of a 
Commission of Inquiry within the time specified, the Governing Body may recommend to the 
Conference ‘such actions it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance’.13 This 
could include recommending the application of diplomatic and trade pressures or the use of 
media and public opinion to focus attention on the issue. 
A special procedure—the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA)—reviews 
complaints concerning violations of freedom of association, whether or not a member state 
has ratified the relevant conventions. This is because the principles of freedom of association 
are considered to be guaranteed under the ILO Constitution to which member states are 
bound, irrespective of ratification of conventions. The CFA is a Governing Body committee. 
If it finds that there has been a violation of freedom of association standards or principles, it 
issues a report through the Governing Body and makes recommendations on how the 
situation could be remedied. Governments are subsequently requested to report on the 
implementation of such recommendations.  
Targeting core labour standards through fundamental conventions 
The mid to late 1990s marked a new phase for the ILO, which sought to reposition itself in 
the multilateral arena and re-establish its credibility as an influential international agency. It 
did this by refocusing the attention of its member states on the implementation of a set of 
core labour standards contained in conventions identified as fundamental. These instruments 
were concerned with the protection of fundamental human rights that were seen to attain 
heightened importance in the context of globalisation. The ILO has been successful in having 
its revised agenda endorsed by a number of international organisations. Key steps leading to 
the adoption of this approach are outlined at Appendix A.  
The ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which was accepted 
at the 1998 International Labour Conference, recognised that: 
                                                 
13.  Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Article 33. 
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 … all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question [that is, the 
fundamental conventions], have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in 
the Organisation, to respect, to promote and to realise, in good faith and in accordance with 
the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of 
those Conventions. 
This Declaration has been recognised as marking ‘a new and important step in the ongoing 
struggle to develop multilateral instruments that will reconcile the globalisation process with 
the need to preserve the core rights of labour.’14 In relation to these core rights, their 
recognition was not to be governed by the national context or the level of economic 
development. Further, as noted above, the source of the obligation to implement these 
principles and fundamental rights was said to lie in membership of the ILO, not ratification of 
the conventions. 
A follow-up to the Declaration established arrangements to encourage member states to 
promote the fundamental principles and rights enshrined in the Declaration. These include 
technical cooperation, simplified annual reporting requirements in relation to unratified 
fundamental conventions, and global reports. The latter are reports submitted to the ILO’s 
annual conference by the Director General and focus on a different fundamental convention 
each year.15 
In 2005, the Director General outlined the underlying rationale for the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, as follows: 
The fundamental principles and rights which are the subject of the Declaration seek to 
enable people ‘to claim freely and on the basis of equality of opportunity their fair share of 
the wealth which they have helped to generate, and to achieve fully their human potential’. 
Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining are 
the foundation for a process in which workers and employers make claims upon each other 
and resolve them through a process of negotiation leading to collective agreements that are 
mutually beneficial. In the process, different interests are reconciled. For workers, joining 
together allows them to have a more balanced relationship with their employer. It also 
provides a mechanism for negotiating a fair share of the results of their work, with due 
respect for the financial position of the enterprise or public service in which they are 
employed. For employers, free association enables firms to ensure that competition is 
constructive, fair and based on a collaborative effort to raise productivity and conditions of 
work.16 
The core standards (and associated fundamental conventions) cover: 
                                                 
14.  C. Nyland and R. Castle, ‘The ILO and the Australian contribution to the international labour 
standards debate’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 41(3), September 1999, p. 365. 
15.  Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work and its follow-up, op. cit.  
16. International Labour Office, Report of the Director General, Organising for social justice: 
Global report under the follow-up to the ILO declaration on fundamental principles and rights 
at work, International Labour Conference, 92nd Session 2004 Report I (B), p. 1. 
8 
The International Labour Organisation’s core labour standards and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
 
• the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour (Conventions Nos. 29 and 
105) 
• the abolition of child labour (Conventions Nos. 138 and 182) 
• freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining 
(Conventions Nos. 87 and 98) 
• the elimination of any discrimination in employment and occupation and the recognition 
of equal remuneration for work of equal value (Conventions Nos. 100 and 111). 
A brief summary of the fundamental conventions is provided at Appendix B. 
The ILO’s Governing Body has also designated another four conventions as priority 
instruments, thereby encouraging member states to ratify them because of their importance 
for the functioning of the international labour standards system. These conventions are: 
• Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81)  
• Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129)  
• Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144) 
• Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122).  
It should be noted, that there has been some debate about the extent to which the 1998 
Declaration and the ILO’s focus on core labour standards has strengthened the international 
labour rights regime. For example, Alston has criticised the ‘lack of definable content for the 
principles,’ and argued that the supervisory and follow-up mechanisms for the Declaration 
needed to be strengthened. He also noted: 
The Declaration’s privileging of a limited range of process rights and its neglect of 
substantive norms such as those relating to safety and health, minimum wages, and 
reasonable conditions of work has been criticised by a great many commentators.17 
A note on the Economic Benefits of Core Labour Standards 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine fully the economic costs and benefits of 
international labour standards. It must be acknowledged, however, that the critics of labour 
standards often argue that the adoption of such standards distorts market mechanisms by 
affecting the price of labour and reducing its supply. They also suggest that the adoption of 
international labour standards can lead to a reduction in foreign investment and may be 
                                                 
17.  P. Alston, ‘Facing up to the complexities of the ILO’s core labour standards agenda’, European 
Journal of International Law, 16(3), 2005, pp. 467–480. 
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regarded as a form of protectionism.18 Consequently, they argue that standard setting should 
be left to a freely operating labour market.19   
There is, however, a significant body of literature that argues that international labour 
standards make good economic sense. Turnell summarises the arguments: 
… the adoption of core labour standards confers economic benefits to developing and 
developed countries alike. It offers the possibility for greater human capital formation, can 
increase the supply of labour through the elimination of arbitrary discrimination, and is 
likely to increase foreign investment into developing countries through its promise of greater 
economic and social stability. The adoption of core labour standards is also likely to bring 
greater democratic legitimacy to international economic institutions, the pillars that support 
the emerging liberal trading order. 20 
This view has received some support from two major studies by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 1996, the OECD released a study 
which examined the link between core labour standards and trade, drawing on information 
from more than 70 countries. It concluded that the adoption of core labour standards did not 
have any negative consequences for the economies and trade of developing countries and did 
not undermine their competitive position.  It also suggested that: 
… it is conceivable that the observance of core standards would strengthen the long-term 
economic performance of all countries. 21 
In 2000, the OECD undertook a second study which essentially confirmed the results of the 
1996 study. In 2000, the OECD tentatively concluded that: 
Countries which strengthen their core labour standards can increase economic efficiency by 
raising skill levels in the workforce and by creating an environment which encourages 
innovation and higher productivity … The results suggest that countries that develop 
democratic institutions – here taken to include core labour rights – before the transition to 
                                                 
18.  That is, insofar as they deprive developing countries of one of their key comparative 
advantages: the ability to use low-cost labour productively. See N. Haworth and S. Hughes, 
‘Trade and international labour standards: Issues and debates over a social clause’, Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 39(2), June 1997, p. 180.  
19.  These arguments are summarised in more detail by Haworth and Hughes, ibid., pp. 179–195. 
Also see J Bhagwati, ‘Policy perspectives and future directions: A view from academia’, 
International labour standards and global economic integration: Proceedings of a symposium, 
United States Department of Labor, Washington DC, July 1994. 
20.  S. Turnell, ‘Core labour standards and the WTO’, Macquarie University, Department of 
Economics, Research Paper Series, March 2001, p. 3.  
21.  OECD, Trade, employment and labour standards: A study of core workers’ rights and 
international trade, Paris, 1996, p. 105. Also see R. Torres, ‘Labour standards and international 
trade’, Special edition of the OECD Observer for the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Singapore, OECD, Paris, December 1996. 
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trade liberalisation will weather the transition with smaller adverse consequences than 
countries without such institutions.22 
In 2001, the World Bank observed that: 
Keeping labour standards low is not an effective way of gaining a competitive advantage 
over trading partners. Indeed, low labour standards are likely to erode competitiveness 
over time because they reduce incentives for workers to improve skills and for firms to 
introduce labour-saving technology.23 
It has also been claimed that the ‘decisive argument’ for having international labour standards 
is that ‘only if workers’ fundamental rights are taken out of the competitive arena by 
international agreement, is it possible to ensure that producers who respect those rights are 
not put at a competitive disadvantage.’24 
The ILO has also examined the economic benefits of the core standards, for example, arguing 
that child labour is detrimental to development since it means that the next generation of 
workers will be unskilled and less well-educated. Further, collective bargaining and tripartite 
dialogue are necessary elements for creating an environment that encourages innovation and 
higher productivity, attracts foreign direct investment and enables the society and economy to 
adjust to external shocks, such as financial crises and natural disasters. In addition, the 
discrimination faced by women and minority groups are important obstacles to economic 
efficiency and social development.25 
More recently, a joint study undertaken by the International Labour Office and the Secretariat 
of the World Trade Organisation examined the connections between trade, labour and social 
policies. It concluded that trade policies and labour and social policies do interact. It also 
found that greater policy coherence in the two domains can have significantly positive 
impacts on the growth effects of trade reforms and thus, ultimately, on their potential to 
improve the quality of jobs around the world.26 
                                                 
22.  OECD, International trade and core labour standards, Paris, 2000, p. 15. 
23.  World Bank, Global economic prospects and the developing countries 2001,Washington 
D.C., 2001. 
24.  C. Scherrer, ‘The economic and political arguments for and against social clauses’, 
Intereconomics, January/February 1996, p. 20. 
25.  For the ILO’s summary of the economic benefits of international labour standards see Rules of 
the game, op. cit., pp. 6–10. Also see Turnell, op. cit., pp. 3–4. Turnell cites a ‘growing array of 
studies independent of official bodies’ that argue the economic benefits of enforcing core 
labour standards. For specific citations refer to his paper.  
26.  International Labour Office and the Secretariat of the World Trade Organisation, Trade and 
employment: Challenges for policy research, a joint ILO/WTO Secretariat study, Geneva, 
February 2007. 
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Australia and the ILO 
Australia has been a member of the ILO since its foundation in 1919 and has played an active 
role in its activities for most of that period. However, as at September 2007, Australia had 
ratified only 55 of the more than 180 current conventions.27 The number of conventions that 
Australia has ratified is generally lower than the number ratified by the Western European 
countries, although it is generally higher than the number ratified by Australia’s neighbours 
and trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region, with the exception of Indonesia, and higher 
than Canada or the USA.28 It should be noted, however, that ratification does not necessarily 
denote compliance.29  
Australia has ratified all but one of the fundamental conventions. Australia has not ratified 
the Minimum Age Convention30 as Table 1 below shows. 
Australia’s relatively low ratification rate is generally explained by reference to: 
• Australia’s general practice of only ratifying conventions when law and practice in all 
jurisdictions is in conformity with the requirements of those conventions. 
• The Constitutional division of legislative power between the Commonwealth and the 
states, which results in multiple jurisdictions, and differences between jurisdictions in law 
and practice and makes implementation more complex. 
• The difficulties involved in securing agreement with the states and territories that are 
considered to be necessary to establish and maintain compliance.31  
                                                 
27.  Of these 55, only 47 are in force—8 have been denounced. 
28.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., pp. 74–76; and B. Creighton, ‘The ILO and the protection of 
fundamental human rights in Australia’, Melbourne University Law Review, 22(2), August 
1998, pp. 254–255. Also see Table 1 for ratifications by selected countries. 
29.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit, p. 76. 
30. The requirements of this convention are summarised at Appendix B. The minimum age for 
employment in Australia is determined, for practical purposes, by State and Territory education 
legislation which requires children aged up to 15 years (16 in Victoria, Queensland and South 
Australia, and 17 in Tasmania) to attend school. This legislation, together with Commonwealth, 
state and territory legislation providing for minimum ages for employment in selected 
occupations, child welfare, and occupational health and safety, can be said to demonstrate 
Australia’s support for the principles of Convention 138. However, Australia’s position has 
been that it is unable to ratify Convention No. 138 as no state or territory government has 
legislated to set a general minimum age for employment. Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations, ‘Australia’s decent work action plan: Background paper’, 22 February 
2005. 
 http://www.ilo.ch/public/english/region/asro/manila/downloads/dwaus.pdf, 
accessed 24/11/2007. 
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However, as Creighton and Stewart point out, ‘there is no legal, as opposed to political or 
practical reason why the Commonwealth could not ratify conventions without the agreement 
of the States and Territories,’ and without law and practice in Australia being judged to be in 
compliance with the convention at the time of ratification. This is because: 
• The prerogative powers of the Crown in relation to treaty making are far reaching and not 
limited to the enumerated matters in relation to which the Australian Parliament has the 
capacity to make laws under the Constitution. 
• Section 51(29) of the Constitution (the external affairs power) can be used to give 
legislative effect to international labour standards. 
• Ratified conventions do not become binding until one year after the date of ratification. 
This provides time in which to bring law and practice into line with the requirements of a 
convention. 32 
In the early 1990s, the Keating (Labor) Government ratified a number of conventions without 
the agreement of all states and territories, and legislated to give effect to Australia’s 
obligations under those agreements: 
• In March 1990, it ratified the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (No. 156) 
without the agreement of New South Wales or the Northern Territory. 
• In February 1993, it ratified the Termination of Employment Convention (No. 158) 
without the formal agreement of any state or territory, and without any Australian 
jurisdiction being in compliance. 
• Ratification of a number of ILO conventions was used as part of the constitutional 
foundation for the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993. Provisions of that Act relating to 
termination of employment, minimum wages, equal pay, parental and family leave and the 
provision of a right to take industrial action were based on Australia’s international 
obligations.33 
The validity of the Keating Government’s strategy was ‘with only very partial exceptions, 
upheld by the High Court in Victoria v Commonwealth.’34  
                                                                                                                                                        
31.  ibid. These arguments also apply to other federal systems, such as the USA and Canada. 
32.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., pp. 76–78. 
33.  ibid; and B. Creighton, ‘The Workplace Relations Act in international perspective’, 10 (1997) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law, p. 35, and ‘The ILO and the protection of fundamental 
human rights in Australia’, Melbourne University Law Review, 22(2), August 1998, pp. 254–
255. 
34.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., p. 77. 
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Developments under the Keating Government were, however, criticised by the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional References Committee in 1995. When the Howard Government took 
office in 1996, it put in place arrangements that gave effect to that Committee’s 
recommendations, which were aimed at enhancing the Commonwealth Parliament’s role in 
treaty-making. The changes included a revised process for ratifying treaties, involving: 
• the tabling of treaties in both Houses of Parliament for at least fifteen days before any 
action is taken that would create legally binding obligations in international law 
• the preparation of a National Interest Analysis for each treaty 
• the establishment of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 
• the establishment of a Treaties Council 
• the creation on the Internet of the Australian Treaties Library.35  
The mechanisms put in place go some way towards addressing the controversial issue of the 
‘democratic deficit’ that may be said to result from executive decisions to become a party to 
international treaties.36 
During the early years of the Howard Government, Australia took a less active role in the 
ILO—withdrawing its Special Labour Adviser from Geneva, decreasing the size of the 
Australian delegation to the ILO’s annual conference and declining to accept election to the 
Governing Body. The Howard Government also moved to minimise reliance on the external 
affairs power of the Constitution as the basis for its workplace relations legislation. However, 
while reliance on the power was reduced, provisions of the Workplace Relations Act relating 
to equal pay, parental leave and termination of employment remain primarily underpinned by 
the external affairs power.37 
As Creighton observed in 1998, Australia’s ‘generally impressive [ILO] compliance record 
has increasingly come under question in recent years.’38 Following implementation of the 
Workplace Relations Act, Australia received an increased number of direct requests and 
observations from the ILO, as Table 2 below shows. Creighton analysed the communications 
and complaints that occurred prior to 1998, and noted that: 
                                                 
35.  Creighton and Stewart, ibid., p. 78. For further detail of these changes and the events that led to 
them see A. Capling, ‘Can the democratic deficit in treaty-making be overcome? Parliament 
and the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’, in The fluid state: International law 
and national legal systems, H. Charlesworth, M. Chaim, D. Hovell and G. Williams (eds.), The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 2005, pp. 64–68.  
36.  This issue is discussed further by J. Uhr, ‘Rethinking legislative powers: Parliamentary 
responses to international challenges’, in The fluid state, ibid., pp. 18–33. 
37.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., pp. 74–75, 110. 
38.  Creighton, Melbourne University Law Review, op. cit., p. 239. 
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 … until recently, none of these communications or complaints disclosed significant non-
compliance with the relevant standards.39 
 Since 1996, however, ILO communications have raised a number of unresolved non-
compliance, or potential non-compliance, issues. In 1998, for the first time in the history of 
its membership of the ILO, Australia was asked to appear before the Conference Committee 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations to explain its non-compliance with 
the obligations under the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention. 40 Since 
that time, Australia has been asked to appear before the Conference Committee in 2000, 
2005, 2006 and 2007.41 
In more recent years, Australia has increased its involvement in the ILO. Australia ratified the 
Occupational Safety and Health Convention (No. 155) in March 2004 and the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Convention (No. 182) in December 2006. Further, the size of the Australian 
delegation to the ILO’s annual conference was increased in 2004 and a Special Labour 
Adviser to Geneva was reinstated in 2006. In 2005, Australia was elected to represent the 
Asia-Pacific region on the Governing Body of the ILO.42 Creighton and Stewart speculated 
in 2005 that the Howard Government’s change of approach likely reflected: 
                                                
… a perception that Australia has a better chance of influencing the policies and 
programmes of the ILO if it is an active participant in the decision-making process of the 
 
39.  ibid, p. 261. For an overview of ‘interesting highlights’ concerning such communications and 
complaints, see pp. 261–278. 
40.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., pp. 74–75. 
41.  It should be noted that Australia’s experience is not without precedent amongst advanced 
Western democratic countries. In the United Kingdom, the Thatcher Government’s labour 
policies and employment legislation attracted regular ILO criticism, as did the New Zealand 
government’s 1991 Employment Contracts Act (which was repealed in 1999). See Haworth and 
Hughes, op. cit.; K. Miller and M. Steele, ‘Employment legislation: Thatcher and after’, 
Industrial Relations Journal, 24(3), September 1993, pp. 224–235; N. Haworth and S. Hughes, 
‘Under scrutiny: The ECA, the ILO and the NZCTU complaint 1993–1995’, New Zealand 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 20(2), August 1995, pp. 143–161; R. Wilson, ‘The decade of 
non-compliance; the New Zealand Government record of non-compliance with international 
labour standards 1990–98’, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 25(1), February 2000, 
pp. 79–94; and B. Creighton, ‘Freedom of association’ in Comparative labour law and 
industrial relations in industrialized market economies, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 
2007, p. 320. 
42.  The Hon Kevin Andrews MP, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Minister 
Assisting the Prime Minister for the Public Service, Media Release, ‘Australia elected to ILO 
Governing Body’, 16505, 9/6/2005. Note that employer and worker members of the Governing 
Body continued to be elected and to play an important role, notwithstanding that the Australian 
Government did not choose to be considered for some years. 
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Organisation rather than a somewhat petulant outsider, as was the case in the period 
following 1996.43  
                                                 
43.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., p. 75. 
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Table 1: Ratification of the ILO’s Fundamental Conventions, as at September 2007, 
selected countries
Core labour standards 
Elimination of all forms 
of forced labour  
Freedom of association & 
recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining 
Elimination of discrimination 
in employment  Abolition of child labour  
Fundamental Conventions  
Forced 
Labour 
Convention 
 
Abolition of 
Forced 
Labour 
Convention 
Freedom of 
Association 
& 
Protection 
of the Right 
to Organise 
Convention
Right to 
Organise & 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Convention 
Equal 
Remuneration 
Convention
Discrimination 
(Employment 
& Occupation) 
Convention 
Minimum Age 
Convention 
Worst Forms 
of Child 
Labour 
Convention 
Total number of 
ratifications (all 
members) 
172  170  148  158  164  166  150  165  
Australia  1932  1960  1973 1973 1974 1973 -  2006 
Canada 1972 - - 1959 1972 1964 - 2000
China - - - - 1990 2006 1999 2002
Cuba 1952 1952 1953 1958 1954 1965 1975 -
France 1951 1951 1937 1969 1953 1981 1990 2001
Germany 1957 1956 1956 1959 1956 1961 1976 2002
Greece 1962 1962 1952 1962 1975 1984 1986 2001
Indonesia 1998 1957 1950 1999 1958 1999 1999 2000
Italy 1958 1958 1934 1968 1956 1963 1981 2000
India - - 1954 2000 1958 1960 - -
Japan 1965 1953 1932 - 1967 - 2000 2001
Republic of 
Korea - - - - 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Netherlands 1950 1993 1933 1959 1971 1973 1976 2002
New Zealand - 2003 1938 1968 1983 1983 - 2001
South Africa 1996 1996 1997 1997 2000 1997 1977 2001
Sweden 1949 1950 1931 1958 1962 1962 1990 2001
Thailand - - 1969 1969 1999 - 2004 2001
UK 1949 1950 1931 1957 1971 1999 2000 2000
USA - - - 1991 - - - 1999
Source: International Labour Organisation, ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards, 
September 2007. 
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Table 2: ILO documents (including comments of the Committee of Experts, the 
Conference Committee and Freedom of Association cases) related to Australia 
Documents relating to Australia Pre-1996# 1996 to  September 2007 
Individual observations of the Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions & 
Recommendations 
 
13 
 
32 
Direct requests of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions & Recommendations 
 
33 
 
133 
General Observations of the Conference Committee 
on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations 
 
- 
 
1* 
Individual Observations of the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations 
 
- 
 
7 
Direct requests regarding submissions to the 
Competent Authorities 
 
- 
 
4 
Freedom of Association cases (complaints by 
employee and employer organisations) 
 
18@ 
 
2 
Commission of Inquiry - - 
Source: International Labour Organisation, ILOLEX Database on ILO documents, September 2007. 
Note: # data for the Committee of Experts is available from 1960. For the Committee on Freedom of 
Association data is available since 1951. 
* This case concerned a failure to supply information and related to a number of countries, 
including Australia. 
@ The majority of these cases related to complaints against State governments. 
18 
The International Labour Organisation’s core labour standards and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
 
The ILO and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
Background 
The scope of this paper is confined to areas of non-compliance, or potential non-compliance, 
with obligations arising from the fundamental conventions and associated with the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (the Workplace Relations Act) and the further changes implemented by 
the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (the Work Choices Act). It 
should be noted, however, that other Commonwealth legislation has also raised some long-
standing issues—including sections of the Trade Practices Act 1974, sections of the 
Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 that provide for criminalisation of industrial action, and 
legislation relating to the building industry and the higher education sector. The ILO has also 
expressed concerns regarding Australia’s failures to overcome discrimination in the labour 
market against Indigenous people and in relation to the regulation of the work of prisoners in 
privately run facilities.44  
The changes introduced by the Workplace Relations Act have been extensively documented 
and discussed and will not be reviewed here.45 The objective of this section is to outline the 
ILO’s areas of concern with international obligations associated with the fundamental 
conventions, as the issue of Australia’s compliance with its international obligations has 
received little attention during the parliamentary and media debates that surrounded passage 
of the reforms.46 These issues have also received limited attention since that time.  
In 1997, following enactment of the Workplace Relations Act, Australia’s compliance with 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 was considered by the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations. The Committee upheld union criticisms 
concerning the lack of protection of employees from dismissal due to anti-union 
discrimination, as well as contraventions of principles relating to the promotion of voluntary 
collective bargaining.47 The ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards in 
June 1998 drew further attention to these criticisms.48 The ILO Committee of Experts has 
                                                 
44.  For further detail see C. Fenwick and I. Landau, ‘Work Choices in international perspective’, 
19 (2006) Australian Journal of Labour Law, p. 131; Creighton, 1997, op. cit., p. 39. 
45.  For an overview of the reforms, see A. Forsyth and C. Sutherland, ‘Collective labour relations 
under siege: The Work Choices legislation and collective bargaining’, 19(2006) Australian 
Journal of Labour Law, pp. 183–197. 
46.  Fenwick and Landau, op. cit., pp. 128–129. The issue received some coverage in the relevant 
Bills Digest, see Parliamentary Library, Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 
2005, Bills Digest, 2 December 2005. 
47.  CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No.98, Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining, 1949 Australia (ratification: 1973) Published: 1998, 
http://www.ilo.org/iloex, accessed 20/9/2007. 
48.  ILCCR: Examination of individual case concerning Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining, 1949 Australia (ratification: 1973) Published: 1998, 
http://www.ilo.org/iloex, accessed 20/9/2007. 
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expressed continuing concerns regarding the Australian legislation every year since then. The 
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has also been involved in trying to convince the 
Australian Government of the need to amend its legislation.49 
The Howard Government, together with the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
has generally not accepted the views of the ILO’s supervisory bodies, resulting in an ongoing 
dialogue through the processes of direct requests, observations, and appearances before the 
committees and conference debates. The Government and employers have argued that: 
• The views of the Committee of Experts are based on incorrect interpretations of the 
conventions (for example, Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 do not expressly provide for a 
right to strike, these conventions do not make collective bargaining mandatory or prescribe 
that it must be the only form of bargaining and they provide scope for variable 
implementation at the national level). 
• The ILO’s supervisory bodies have misunderstood the operation of Australian workplace 
law and practice in significant respects (for example, a worker negotiating an individual 
agreement may be represented by a trade union, and participation in the formal system set 
up by the Workplace Relations Act was voluntary, ‘which meant that workers, employers 
and their representative organisations were free to negotiate and make agreements outside 
the formal system’). 
• Australia’s legislative arrangements make provision for collective bargaining machinery 
and collective bargaining continues to be the norm in Australia. 
• The ILO’s charter of reducing social disadvantage through decent and productive 
employment is being fulfilled in Australia through an economic and workplace relations 
system which has achieved record levels of employment, high living standards, investment 
in skills, low levels of unemployment and low levels of industrial disputation. 
• The views of the Committee of Experts are only observations, rather than conclusive 
findings, and dialogue between the Committee and the government is continuing with a 
view to resolving areas of disagreement and clarifying understanding of the legislation.50 
                                                 
49.  For example, see Complaint against the Government of Australia presented by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Transport Workers’ Federation 
(ITF), the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Maritime Union of Australia 
(MUA) Report No. 320, Case No. 1963, pp. 29–31, http://www.ilo.org/iloex, accessed 
20/9/2007.   
50.  The Government’s arguments are summarised in ILCCR: Examination of individual case 
concerning Convention No.98, Right to Organise and Collective bargaining, 1949 Australia 
(ratification: 1973) Published: 2000, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex, accessed 20/9/2007; ILCCR: 
Examination of individual case concerning Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining, 1949 Australia (ratification: 1973) Published: 2007, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilox, accessed 20/9/2007; ILCCR: Examination of individual case 
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In 2006 and 2007, the Howard Government also argued that substantial amendments to the 
Workplace Relations Act as a result of the Work Choices amendments meant that earlier 
comments and findings by the ILO’s supervisory bodies were no longer valid. 
The ILO’s concerns regarding compliance with binding international legal commitments 
arising from fundamental ILO Conventions relate to Australia’s efforts to protect freedom of 
association and encourage and promote collective bargaining (Conventions Nos. 87 and 98). 
The lack of progress towards equal remuneration has also been a concern. More specifically, 
those aspects of the Workplace Relations Act which have given rise to concerns are 
provisions which:  
• give primacy to individual over collective forms of agreement 
• restrict the level at which bargaining may occur  
• limit what may be included in a collective agreement 
• raise the potential for anti-union discrimination 
• limit trade unions’ rights to organise 
• impose limits on strike action beyond those envisaged by the relevant convention. 
The following sections outline the ILO’s concerns in more detail, with particular reference to 
observations and requests made during 2006 and 2007.51 The ILO’s more recent observations 
have been modified to some degree by the dialogue and debate which has occurred since 
1997. However, a number of significant areas of concern have remained outstanding for the 
last 10 years and, in some cases, have intensified following the Work Choices changes. At the 
time of publication of this paper, the Australian Government had not provided a report to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 
1948 and Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949 Australia 
(ratification: 1973) Published: 2006, http://www.ilo.org/ilox, accessed 20/9/2007; and ILCCR: 
Examination of individual case concerning Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining, 1949 Australia (ratification: 1973) Published: 2005, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilox, accessed 20/9/2007; also see the Hon. Peter Reith, MP, Minister for 
Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, Press release, ‘ILO wrong on 
Australia’s Workplace Relations Act’, 12 March 1998; and the Hon. Peter Reith, MP, Minister 
for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, Press Release, ‘Government rejects 
ILO observations’, 10 March 2000; and the Hon. Joe Hockey, MP, Minister for Employment 
and Workplace Relations, Press release, ‘Sharan Burrow takes fear campaign offshore’, 5 June 
2007. 
51.  Fenwick and Landau, op. cit., analysed the Work Choices proposals against Australia’s 
international obligations prior to the passage of the Work Choices amendments. The following 
section provides an update on the basis of the ILO supervisory bodies’ response since the 
legislation was passed. 
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ILO that explained the effect of the Work Choices amendments and the implications for 
compliance with Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. Given the outcome of the 2007 election, the 
task for the Rudd Labour Government will be to outline its proposed changes to the industrial 
relations framework, and their implications for Australia’s compliance with its international 
obligations. 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise52 
Exclusion from protection 
Convention 98 requires that all workers are protected from anti-union discrimination, at the 
time of engagement, during employment and in relation to termination of employment. The 
Workplace Relations Act includes protections from anti-union discrimination; making 
dismissal on the grounds of union membership unlawful. However, the Committee of Experts 
has found that section 170CC of the Workplace Relations Act (now section 639 of the 
Workplace Relations Act, as amended by the Work Choices Act) allows regulations which 
may provide for additional exclusions. This may effectively exclude some employees from 
protection under section 170CK of the Workplace Relations Act (now section 659), which 
relates to protection from unlawful termination. The Committee of Experts has requested the 
Government to provide information on the particular classes of employees excluded and the 
manner in which the exclusion has been applied in practice.  
Protection at the time of recruitment 
The Committee of Experts had identified the need to amend sections 298L and 170WG(1) of 
the Workplace Relations Act (now sections 793 and 400(5) respectively) to provide adequate 
protection against anti-union discrimination at the time of recruitment. In 2007, the 
Committee reiterated its concerns: 
These sections did not seem to afford adequate guarantees against anti-union discrimination 
to the extent that they allowed offers of employment to be conditional on the signing of an 
AWA (‘AWA or nothing’) without this being considered as duress by the courts. The 
Committee observes that section 400(6) of the [Workplace Relations] Act, as amended by 
the Work Choices Act, now further strengthens the previous provisions by explicitly 
specifying that offering an ‘AWA or nothing’ does not amount to duress. The Committee 
once again emphasises that workers who might refuse to negotiate an AWA at the time of 
recruitment should be afforded legal protection against acts of anti-union discrimination 
relative to such refusal and emphasises that the right of workers to join the organisation of 
                                                 
52.  The Committee of Expert comments quoted in this section derive (unless otherwise indicated) 
from CEACR: Individual Observation concerning the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No 98) Australia (ratification: 1973) Published: 2007, 
www.ilo.org/ilolex , accessed 20/9/2007. 
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their own choosing, combined with the legitimate objective of determining their conditions 
of employment through collective bargaining, should be fully protected.53  
The Committee of Experts has requested the Government to indicate the measures taken or 
contemplated to repeal section 400(6) of the Workplace Relations Act and to amend sections 
793 and 400(5).  
Protection in the context of the negotiation of multiple business agreements 
Section 423(1)(b)(i) of the Workplace Relations Act, as amended by the Work Choices Act, 
provided that a bargaining period cannot be initiated with regard to a multiple business 
agreement unless an employer (rather than a union) obtained authorisation from the 
Employment Advocate54 (section 332). The Employment Advocate must not grant the 
authorisation unless he or she is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so (section 
332(3)). The Committee of Experts noted that, in the absence of a bargaining period, 
industrial action is not protected (section 437). It concluded that workers are not protected 
under the Workplace Relations Act against acts of anti-union discrimination, in particular, 
dismissals, if they organise or participate in industrial action in support of multiple business 
agreements.  
The Committee also noted that the Work Choices reforms introduce further restrictions 
concerning pattern bargaining.55  They did this by prohibiting industrial action in relation to 
pattern bargaining (section 439 of the Workplace Relations Act, as amended) and requiring 
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to suspend or terminate the 
bargaining period where such bargaining is occurring, thereby preventing the taking of 
lawful, protected industrial action56 (sections 431(1)(b) and 437).  
The Committee considered that action related to the negotiation of multiple business 
agreements and pattern bargaining represent legitimate trade union activity for which 
adequate protection should be afforded by the law. The Committee also emphasised that the 
choice of the bargaining level should normally be made by the parties themselves who are in 
the best position to decide this matter.  
The Committee also requested that the government indicate any measures taken or 
contemplated to amend sections 423 and 431 of the Workplace Relations Act. It regards such 
measures as necessary to ensure that workers are adequately protected against acts of anti-
                                                 
53.  CEACR: Individual Observation concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No 98), op. cit. 
54.  As explained further below, in 2007, the Workplace Authority replaced the Employment 
Advocate. 
55.  Pattern bargaining means negotiations seeking common wages or conditions of employment for 
two or more proposed collective agreements with different employers or even different 
subsidiaries of the same parent company. 
56.  Protected action is explained below in relation to the right to strike.  
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union discrimination, in particular, dismissal, for negotiating collective agreements at 
whatever level deemed appropriate by the parties.  
Workplace access 
In 2007, the Committee of Experts made a direct request to the Australian Government 
concerning the right of union representatives to visit workplaces. It noted that the Work 
Choices Act made the right of entry of trade union representatives to the workplace in order 
to meet with workers subject to a special permit requirement (section 740). Such a permit 
may be refused (and can also be revoked or suspended) in certain circumstances outlined in 
the legislation. The Committee noted that section 760 limited the permit holder to entering 
premises for the purposes of holding discussions with eligible employees; that is, employees 
who carry out work covered by an award or collective agreement (but not an AWA) that is 
binding on the organisation and are members of the permit holder’s trade union or eligible to 
become members.  
Having examined the provisions, the Committee reminded the government that the right of 
trade union officers to have access to places of work and to communicate with management 
is a basic activity of trade unions which should not be subject to the interference of 
authorities. It observed that the ‘restrictive conditions’ set for the granting of permits ‘could 
constitute a serious obstacle to the exercise of this right’. It also emphasised that: 
… a trade unionist should not be limited in discussions at a workplace only to eligible 
employees, but should also be able to appraise workers of the potential advantages of 
unionisation or of coverage of a collective agreement instead of an AWA.57 
The Committee requested the government to indicate any measures taken or contemplated to 
amend these sections.58 
Collective Bargaining59 
Key ILO requirements relating to collective bargaining (based in Convention No. 98) are that 
the public authorities should take appropriate measures to encourage and promote—as 
distinct from merely provide for—voluntary negotiations with a view to concluding 
collective agreements. However, the ILO has recognised that the parties cannot be compelled 
to reach agreement and that effective bargaining relationships can only be achieved by the 
                                                 
57.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) Australia (ratification: 1973) Published: 2007, 
www.ilo.org/ilolex, p. 1, accessed 20/9/2007. 
58. ibid., pp. 1–2.  
59.   The Committee of Expert comments quoted in this section derive (unless otherwise indicated) 
from CEACR: Individual Observation concerning the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No 98), op. cit. 
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voluntary and persistent efforts of both parties.60 The ILO’s supervisory bodies have 
emphasised that interference with the autonomy of the bargaining partners (for example, by 
measures taken unilaterally by the authorities to restrict the level at which bargaining may 
occur or restrict the content of agreements) are generally contrary to the concept of voluntary 
bargaining.61  
Protection against acts of interference in the framework of collective bargaining 
The Committee of Experts noted that section 170LJ(1)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 
(now section 328(a)) gives employers wide discretion in selecting a bargaining partner. It 
enables an employer to make an agreement with one or more organisations of employees 
where each organisation has ‘at least one member’ in the enterprise. The Committee 
suggested the establishment of a mechanism to undertake the rapid and impartial examination 
of allegations of acts of interference in the context of the selection of a bargaining partner. It 
requested the government to provide information on whether such a mechanism exists or, if 
not, the measures taken or contemplated with a view to establishing one.  
Measures to promote free and voluntary collective bargaining 
Convention 98 requires member states to take measures to encourage and promote voluntary 
negotiation with a view to the regulation of the terms and conditions of employment by 
collective agreements. Since 1997, the Committee of Experts has indicated that Australia has 
failed to meet this obligation because the Workplace Relations Act has given primacy to 
individual over collective agreements. The ILO’s supervisory bodies have emphasised that 
member states are required to take steps to ensure that collective bargaining will not only be 
allowed, but encouraged at the level determined by the bargaining parties.62  
Prior to the adoption of the Work Choices amendments, an AWA did not operate to the 
exclusion of a collective agreement if the latter was already in operation and until its expiry, 
unless the collective agreement expressly allowed a subsequent AWA to operate to its 
exclusion. Nevertheless, the Committee criticised the fact that a collective agreement that was 
subsequent to an AWA did not prevail over the AWA until the expiration of the AWA. In the 
                                                 
60.  B. Gernigon, A. Odero and H. Guido, ‘ILO Principles concerning collective bargaining’, 
International Labour Review, 139(1) (2000), pp. 40–43 and 
 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/publ/revue/download/pdf/gernigon.pdf,  
accessed 14/9/2007. 
61.  See B. Creighton, ‘Freedom of Association’, op. cit., pp. 312–313. 
62. ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 86th Session, Report III, 1998, p. 223. 
Also see Complaint against the Government of Australia presented by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Transport Workers’ Federation 
(ITF), the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Maritime Union of Australia 
(MUA) Report No. 320, Case No. 1963, http://www.ilo.org/iloex. pp. 29–31, accessed 
20/9/2007.   
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Committee’s view, this prevented workers from profiting from any favourable provisions in a 
subsequently negotiated collective agreement.  
In 2007, the Committee of Experts noted that amendments introduced by the Work Choices 
Act gave further primacy to AWAs over collective agreements. In particular, it suggested 
that:  
• Section 348(2) of the Workplace Relations Act provides that a collective agreement has no 
effect while an AWA operates in relation to an employee. This is so irrespective of 
whether the AWA was made before or after the collective agreement and irrespective of 
the period of operation of the collective agreement. 
• The incentive for employers to use AWAs in order to reduce wages and conditions of 
employment has been ‘substantially increased’ by the repeal of the requirement that an 
AWA should not disadvantage employees in comparison to the terms of an applicable 
award. The previously applicable no disadvantage test has been replaced with a 
requirement only that the agreement not exclude the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions 
Standard setting forth key minimum entitlements relating to pay, hours of work, annual 
and other types of leave.63  
• The award conditions which apply to existing employees can be displaced by specific 
provision in the AWA (section 354), so that acquired rights are not protected. 
• In the case of new employees, an AWA inferior to the collective agreement can be 
required as a condition of employment. The Committee noted that the primacy given to 
AWAs under the Work Choices Act removes the ability of unions to bargain collectively 
on behalf of their members in any practical sense, given that individual AWAs are likely 
to expire on different dates and their permitted period of operation has been extended from 
three to five years (section 352). This means that there is never a time when all employees 
are in a position to bargain collectively.  
The Committee indicated that it: 
… considers that giving primacy to AWAs, which are individual agreements, over 
collective agreements, is contrary to Article 4 of the Convention which calls for the 
encouragement and promotion of voluntary negotiations with a view to the adoption of 
collective agreements.64 
The Committee requested the Australian Government to indicate the measures taken or 
contemplated to amend section 348(2) of the Workplace Relations Act ‘so as to ensure that 
                                                 
63.  See further below regarding the introduction of the fairness test since these comments were 
made. 
64. ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No 98), op. cit., p. 3. 
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AWAs may prevail over collective agreements only to the extent that they are more 
favourable to the workers.’  
Note that the ILO supervisory bodies’ concerns in relation to the removal of the no 
disadvantage test have not yet been reviewed in the light of the fairness test introduced 
following the enactment of the Workplace Relations Amendment (A Stronger Safety Net) Act 
2007, which received Royal Assent on 28 June 2007. This Act amended the Workplace 
Relations Act by introducing a fairness test for workplace agreements lodged on, or after, 7 
May 2007. The fairness test is intended to ensure that employees receive fair compensation if 
their AWA or collective agreement removes or modifies protected conditions, such as penalty 
rates and overtime loadings. 
Negotiations with non-unionised workers 
The Committee of Experts identified the need to amend section 170LK(6)(b) of the 
Workplace Relations Act, which allowed for negotiations to take place directly with non-
unionised workers instead of representative trade unions in the enterprise. The Committee 
noted that the Workplace Relations Act, as amended by the Work Choices Act, places on an 
equal footing various types of agreements, such as union collective agreements (section 328), 
AWAs (section 326) and employee collective agreements (section 327). Further, section 4 of 
the Workplace Relations Act defines a collective agreement as either an employee collective 
agreement or a union collective agreement.  
The Committee observed that Article 4 of the Convention requires the encouragement and 
promotion of voluntary negotiations between employers or employers’ organisations and 
workers’ organisations. It requested the Australian Government to take measures to ensure 
that employee collective agreements do not undermine workers’ organisations and their 
ability to conclude collective agreements. It also asked the government to indicate the 
measures taken or contemplated with a view to ensuring that negotiations with non-unionised 
workers take place only where there is no representative trade union in the enterprise.  
Authorisation of multiple business agreements 
The Committee identified the need to amend section 170LC(4) of the Workplace Relations 
Act, which required the AIRC to refuse the certification of multiple business agreements 
unless certification was in the public interest. Following its amendment by the Work Choices 
Act, the Workplace Relations Act enabled the Employment Advocate (rather than the AIRC) 
to authorise the making or varying of multiple business agreements (sections 151(1)(h) and 
347(3)). The Committee noted that whereas the AIRC is a quasi-judicial body, the 
Employment Advocate is part of the administration, appointed by the Governor-General, and 
subject to the directions of the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations with 
which he or she must comply (section 152).  
The Employment Advocate must not grant authorisation to make or vary a multiple business 
agreement unless satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. In making this decision, the 
Employment Advocate must have regard to whether the matters could be dealt with more 
appropriately in a collective agreement other than a multiple business agreement and to any 
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other matter specified in regulations (section 332(3)). Authorisation can be granted only at 
the request of the employer (section 332). Trade unions are not able to request authorisation. 
Any employer who lodges an unauthorised agreement with the Employment Advocate incurs 
a penalty (sections 343 and 407). Moreover, regulations may set a procedure for applying for 
authorisation to the Employment Advocate and the Employment Advocate ‘need not consider 
an application if it is not made in accordance with the procedure’ (section 332(2)). Finally, 
multiple business agreements are identified not only as agreements relating to one or more 
single businesses, but also relating to one or more parts of a single business (section 
331(1)(a)(ii)). The Committee said that this effectively obliged the parties ‘to carry out 
fragmented negotiations within single businesses.’ Similar authorisation requirements are set 
in relation to variations of multiple business agreements (section 376).  
The Committee noted that the exclusion of pattern bargaining from protected action 
introduced in the Workplace Relations Act by the Work Choices Act (see above) prevents 
parallel bargaining on a multi-employer basis, or on the basis of several subsidiaries of the 
same parent company. This, it found, forced an even greater focus on the single business, 
even in cases where the business might be part of a larger group of enterprises with common 
ownership and management.  
The Committee observed that the level of collective bargaining should be decided by the 
parties themselves and not be imposed by law and noted that: 
… legislation, which makes the entry into force of collective agreements subject to prior 
approval by the administrative authority, at the latter’s discretion, is incompatible with the 
Convention and a violation of the principle of autonomy of the parties.65 
The Committee requested the government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated to 
repeal or amend sections 151(1)(h), 152, 331(1)(a)(ii) and 332(3) of the Workplace Relations 
Act. It indicated that such measures should ensure that: 
• multiple business agreements are not subject to the requirement of prior authorisation at 
the discretion of the Employment Advocate  
• the determination of the bargaining level is left to the discretion of the parties and is not 
imposed by law or by decision of the administrative authority.   
It should be noted that since the Committee of Experts made its observations in relation to the 
role of the Employment Advocate, the Workplace Relations Amendment (A Stronger Safety 
Net) Bill 2007 was passed. That bill amended the Workplace Relations Act to establish a 
fairness test for workplace agreements and create two new statutory agencies: the Workplace 
Authority and the Workplace Ombudsman. The Workplace Authority replaced the 
Employment Advocate—taking over many of its functions, as well as being given the 
additional functions of administering the fairness test and providing information and advice 
                                                 
65.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No 98), op. cit., p. 5. 
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to employees and employers about workplace agreement-making and the Commonwealth’s 
workplace relations laws. The Workplace Ombudsman took over the functions previously 
undertaken by the Office of Workplace Services—including information, education, 
inspection, inquiry and enforcement roles. These changes have not addressed the concerns 
raised by the Committee of Experts.  
Restrictions on the content of collective bargaining 
The Committee of Experts had indicated the need to amend section 187AA of the Workplace 
Relations Act, which excluded negotiations over strike pay from the scope of collective 
bargaining. In 2007, the Committee observed that section 507 of the Workplace Relations 
Act, as amended by the Work Choices Act, prohibited payments for days off work due to 
industrial action. (For consideration of the right to strike see further below). 
The Committee noted that the Work Choices Act extended the list of subjects over which 
negotiations are excluded, by forbidding negotiations and the reaching of an agreement over 
prohibited content. The range of matters constituting prohibited content is specified in 
regulations (sections 436 and 356 of the Workplace Relations Act). The Workplace Relations 
Regulations 2006, specify prohibited content in a non-exhaustive manner.66 In addition to 
prohibiting these matters from being negotiated, the Workplace Relations Act, as amended by 
the Work Choices Act, also introduces a substantial financial penalty for a person who seeks 
to include prohibited content in an agreement, or who is reckless as to whether a term 
contains prohibited content (sections 365 and 407).  
The Committee of Experts observed that the issues listed above as constituting prohibited 
content represented to a large extent the type of matters that have traditionally been subjects 
for collective bargaining. It said that, as a general rule, negotiation over such matters should 
be left to the discretion of the parties and indicated that: 
… measures taken unilaterally by the authorities to restrict the scope of negotiable issues are 
often incompatible with the Convention and the free and voluntary nature of collective 
bargaining. In the event of doubt as to the matters falling within the purview of collective 
bargaining, tripartite discussions for the preparation, on a voluntary basis, of guidelines for 
                                                 
66.  That is, matters that do not pertain to the employment relationship; objectionable provisions, 
including provisions which require a person to encourage trade union membership or indicating 
support for such membership, or requiring or permitting payment of a bargaining services fee; 
payroll deduction systems for union dues; leave to attend training provided by a trade union; 
paid leave to attend union meetings; process for renegotiating the agreement on its expiry; right 
of entry to the premises for union officials; union representation rights in disputes procedures, 
unless specifically requested by the employee; restrictions on the use of contractors and labour 
hire; forgoing of annual leave other than in accordance with the Act; encouragement or 
discouragement of trade union membership; allowing of industrial action; remedies for unfair 
dismissal; direct or indirect restrictions on AWAs; and discriminatory terms. 
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collective bargaining could be a particularly appropriate method for resolving such 
difficulties.’67 
The Committee requested the government to consider tripartite discussions for the 
preparation of collective bargaining guidelines and to indicate in its next report any measures 
taken or contemplated to amend the Workplace Relations Regulations, 2006, and to ensure 
that any prohibited content of collective agreements is in conformity with the principle of the 
free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining enshrined in Article 4 of the Convention.  
Greenfield agreements68 
Following the introduction of the Workplace Relations Act, the Committee of Experts 
indicated the need to amend section 170LT(10), which excessively restricted the opportunity 
for workers in a new business to choose their bargaining agent by enabling the employer to 
negotiate a greenfield agreement and pre-select a bargaining partner prior to the employment 
of any persons in the new business.  
In 2007, the Committee noted the Workplace Relations Act, as amended by the Work 
Choices Act, had introduced a new category of greenfield agreement with a nominal life of 
no more than one year.69 For this new category of agreement, the requirement for an 
agreement to be made with a trade union was removed. This enabled the employer to 
determine unilaterally the terms and conditions of employment through an employer 
greenfield agreement (that is, an ‘agreement’ made by the employer with the employer as the 
only party) (section 330 of the Workplace Relations Act). The changes also extended the 
scope of greenfield agreements beyond the establishment of a new business, project or 
undertaking to cover any new activity proposed to be carried out by a government authority, a 
body in which a government has a controlling interest or which has been established by law 
for a public purpose (section 323). The Committee also noted that the law had been amended 
to specify that a new project which is of the same nature as the employer’s existing business 
activities is included in the definition of ‘greenfield’. 
The Committee concluded that: 
… the inclusion of employer greenfields agreements, to the total exclusion of any attempts 
at good-faith bargaining, within the context of a much enlarged definition of new business to 
further include the very broad concept of ‘new activity’, coupled with the greater primacy of 
                                                 
67.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No 98), op. cit., p. 6, with reference to ILO, General Survey on Freedom of 
Association, 1994, paragraph 250. 
68.  That is, agreements for a new project, business or undertaking that an employer is proposing to 
establish which are made prior to the engagement of employees. 
69.  Other greenfield agreements have a nominal life of up to five years. 
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AWAs, would appear to seriously hinder the possibilities of workers in such circumstances 
from negotiating their terms and conditions of employment.70  
The Committee has requested the government to indicate any measures taken or 
contemplated to amend the relevant provisions of the Workplace Relations Act, so as to 
ensure that the choice of bargaining agent, even in new businesses, may be made by the 
workers themselves. It has also called on the government to indicate that workers will not be 
prohibited from negotiating their terms and conditions of employment in the first year of their 
service for the employer—even if an employer greenfields agreement has been registered.  
Building industry 
The Committee of Experts has also requested the Government to indicate the measures taken 
or contemplated to bring the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 into 
conformity with the Collective Bargaining Convention, in particular with regard to: 
• The revision of section 64 of the Act so as to ensure that the determination of the 
bargaining level is left to the discretion of the parties and is not imposed by law, by 
decision of the administrative authority. 
• The promotion of collective bargaining, especially by ensuring that there are no financial 
penalties or incentives linked to undue restrictions of collective bargaining. Sections 27 
and 28 of the Act authorise the Minister to deny Commonwealth funding to contractors 
bound by a collective agreement that, although lawful, does not meet the requirements of 
the Building Code.71 The latter excludes a wide range of matters from the scope of 
collective bargaining, and contains financial incentives to ensure that AWAs may override 
collective agreements.  
This legislation has also been brought to the attention of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association which has made similar recommendations.72 
                                                 
70.   ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No 98), op. cit., p. 7. 
71.  The Building Code is defined in the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 
as a code of practice consisting of one or more documents issued by the Minister in respect of 
building work, which may relate to occupational health and safety matters in the building 
industry, but is not necessarily limited to such matters. 
72.  See Complaint against the Government of Australia presented by the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU) and supported by the Trade Unions International of Workers of the 
Building, Wood and Building Materials Industries (UITBB) Report No. 338, Case No. 2326, 
www.ilo.org/ilex  pp. 17–18, accessed 20/9/2007. 
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Higher education sector 
The Committee of Experts has identified the need to amend sections 33-35 of the Higher 
Education Support Act 2003, and the Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements. 
It regards these Acts as raising: 
… obstacles to collective bargaining similar to those raised by the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 … by: (1) providing economic incentives to ensure that collective agreements contain 
exceptions in favour of AWAs; and (2) allowing for negotiations with non-unionised 
workers even where representative trade unions exist in the unit.73 
Committee’s concluding comments on collective bargaining 
In 2007, the Committee of Experts concluded by addressing key arguments of the 
government and employers, and stating: 
The Committee observes, as it has already done on numerous occasions in the past, that a 
large number of provisions of the [Workplace Relations] Act have the effect of preventing 
the negotiating parties from exercising a free choice between different forms of bargaining. 
The Committee is particularly concerned by the primacy accorded to individual contracts 
(AWAs) over collective agreements in the [Workplace Relations] Act, the obstacles 
contained in this Act with regard to bargaining at any level above that of the workplace, and 
the express prohibition of bargaining over a very wide range of matters which normally 
constitute common topics in free and voluntary negotiations, as well as the heavy penalties 
incurred in case the parties try to negotiate such subjects. The Committee observes that the 
above measures can in no way be seen as measures to encourage and promote collective 
bargaining as they deny the parties any choice and restrict their bargaining autonomy and 
free will. In the Committee’s view, although the expressions ‘where necessary’ and subject 
to ‘national conditions’ found in Article 4 of the Convention allow for a wide range of 
different national practices in the implementation of measures for the encouragement and 
promotion of collective bargaining, they do not authorise in any way the introduction of 
disincentives, obstacles to, and downright prohibitions of negotiations which amount to a 
negation of the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining enshrined in Article 4 of 
the Convention.’ 74 (Emphasis added.) 
The Committee reiterated the request of the Conference Committee for the government to 
engage in consultations with the representative employers’ and workers’ organisations with 
respect to these matters. It also requested the government to provide detailed statistical data 
on the impact of the Workplace Relations Act and its most recent amendments on the number 
and coverage of collective agreements in the country.  
                                                 
73.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98), op. cit., pp. 7–8. 
74.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98), op. cit., pp. 8–9. 
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The right to strike 
Creighton and Stewart explain that: 
Neither the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 
1948 (No. 87) nor the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No. 
98) makes any express reference to the right to strike. However, the right to strike is taken to 
be an integral part of the Principles of Freedom of Association developed by the Governing 
Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association, and is taken as read into Articles 3, 8 and 10 
of Convention No 87.75 By contrast, a right to strike in support of economic and social 
interests is expressly protected by the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.76 (Emphasis added.) 
In Australia, under the common law, all industrial action is unlawful as it constitutes a breach 
of contract and/or a tort. Concerns had been expressed by the Committee of Experts about 
limitations on industrial action in Australia as far back as 1989 and 1991.77 In 1993, the 
Keating Government’s industrial relations reforms, under the Industrial Relations Reform Act 
1993, partially addressed these concerns by giving workers seeking to negotiate an enterprise 
agreement under federal law a right to take protected action in support of their claims. Such 
action was protected in that employers were prevented from taking common law action 
against the involved employees. However, as Fenwick and Landau note: 
… the ILO’s supervisory bodies have criticised this regime, repeatedly emphasising that the 
right to strike should not be limited to industrial disputes that are likely to be resolved 
through the signing of a collective agreement. The right to strike extends to enabling 
workers to express their dissatisfaction through industrial action with economic and social 
policy matters that affect their interests.78 
In addition to these general concerns, the Committee of Experts has raised specific concerns 
about the conformity of several legislative provisions with the legitimate scope for industrial 
action. In particular, it has requested the government to amend the following provisions:79 
                                                 
75.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., p. 533. 
76.  ibid., Creighton, op. cit., 1997, p. 315; and Fenwick and Landau, op. cit., p. 140. 
77.  Creighton, op. cit., 1997, p. 43 and 1998, pp. 273–275. 
78.  Fenwick and Landau, op. cit., pp. 140–141. Also see Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., p. 537 and 
Creighton, ‘Freedom of Association’, op. cit., pp. 315–319 for consideration of the extent of, 
and limitations on, the right to strike. 
79.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No 98), op. cit.; CEARC: Individual Observation concerning Convention 
No 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948, Australia 
(ratification:1973), Published: 2004, www.ilo.org/ilolex ; and CEARC: Individual Observation 
concerning Convention No 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 
1948, Australia (ratification:1973), Published: 1999, www.ilo.org/ilolex. Accessed 20/9/2007. 
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• Section 170MN of the Workplace Relations Act, which prohibited industrial action in 
support of multiple business agreements. Section 423(1)(b)(i) of the Workplace Relations 
Act as amended by the Work Choices Act, excludes such agreements from the procedure 
for initiating a bargaining period, thereby preventing protected industrial action in relation 
to such agreements.  
• Section 187AA of the Workplace Relations Act—prohibiting industrial action in support 
of a claim for strike pay (section 508 of the amended Act).  
• Section 45D of the Trade Practices Act 1974, which prohibits secondary boycotts, and 
section 438 of Workplace Relations Act.80 
• Section 170MW of the Workplace Relations Act—which provided for the power of the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to terminate a bargaining period, and 
thus the ability to take protected industrial action, when the action was threatening to 
cause significant damage to the Australian economy or an important part of it (section 
430(3)(c)(ii) of the amended Act).  
• Section 30J of the Crimes Act, 1914—which prohibits industrial action threatening trade 
or commerce with other countries or among states. 
• Section 30K of the Crimes Act, 1914—prohibiting boycotts resulting in the obstruction or 
hindrance of the performance of services by the Australian Government or the transport of 
goods or persons in international trade. 
In 2007, the Committee noted that, according to the ACTU, not only had the Committee’s 
previous comments not been addressed, but the Work Choices Act introduced additional 
prohibitions on industrial action,81 more specifically: 
• preventing the taking of lawful industrial action relative to pattern bargaining (see 
above)(section 421)  
• further narrowing the range of matters which can be the subject of industrial action by 
providing that such action is not protected if it is taken in support of claims which include 
prohibited content(section 436) 
                                                 
80.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit., pp. 577–582 note that section 45D was repeatedly criticised by 
the ILO’s Committee of Experts for the extent to which it prohibited activity which ought to be 
lawful in terms of Convention 87, and outline reforms to the provision in 1993 and 1996.  
81.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No 87) Australia (ratification: 1973) Published: 2007, 
www.ilo.org/ilolex. For an outline of the changes made by the Work Choices Act with respect 
to industrial action, see S. McCrystal, ‘Smothering the right to strike: Work Choices and 
industrial action’, 19 (2006) Australian Journal of Labour Law, p. 201. 
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• tightening the prohibition of industrial action taken in concert with other parties who are 
not protected (that is, sympathy strikes)(section 438). It is now mandatory for the AIRC to 
order that such action stop or if it has not yet occurred, that it not occur 
• removing the discretion formerly held by the AIRC in respect of suspending or 
terminating a bargaining period in case of danger to the economy, and making it 
mandatory to do so (section 430) 
• making provision for a third party who is affected by the industrial action to apply for the 
suspension or termination of the bargaining period, which must be granted if the AIRC is 
satisfied that the employer is adversely affected and economic loss is also caused to the 
applicant (that is, without consideration of the interests of the employees involved)(section 
433) 
• enabling the Minister unilaterally to issue a declaration terminating a bargaining period in 
circumstances including threatened economic damage, thereby preventing the taking of 
protected industrial action (section 498). Section 500(a) provides for compulsory 
arbitration in this case with the decision being binding for up to five years under section 
504(3). 
The Committee observed that to the extent that industrial action which is unprotected under 
the above provisions may also fall under the definition of coercion and duress in section 
400(1) of the Workplace Relations Act (which prohibits industrial action with intent to coerce 
another person to agree to a collective agreement), it may lead to heavy pecuniary penalties 
under section 407 of the Workplace Relations Act. 
The Committee emphasised that strikes can be prohibited under the Convention only in 
essential services in the strict sense of the term. That is, the interruption of which would 
endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population, and for 
public servants exercising authority in the name of the State, in addition to the armed forces 
and police. The Committee concluded that: 
… the prohibitions noted above with regard to multi-employer agreements, pattern 
bargaining, secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes, negotiations over ‘prohibited content’ 
that should otherwise fall within possible subjects for collective bargaining, danger to the 
economy, etc., go beyond the restrictions which are permissible under the Convention. 
The Committee requested the government to indicate in its next report the measures taken or 
contemplated so as bring the Workplace Relations Act into conformity with the Convention.  
Building industry and industrial action 
The Committee of Experts also requested the government to report on any measures taken or 
contemplated with a view to:  
• amending sections 36, 37 and 38 of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement 
Act, 2005, which prohibit all unlawful industrial action (which is defined as industrial 
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action undertaken with respect to building work which is industrially motivated, 
constitutionally connected and which is not protected under the Workplace Relations 
Act)82 
• amending sections 39, 40 and 48–50 of the Act so as to eliminate any excessive 
impediments, penalties and sanctions against industrial action in the building and 
construction industry83 
• introducing sufficient safeguards into the Act so as to ensure that the functioning of the 
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner and inspectors does not lead to 
interference in the internal affairs of trade unions. This could include provisions on the 
possibility of lodging an appeal before the courts against the Commissioner’s notices prior 
to the handing over of documents (sections 52, 53, 55, 56 and 59 of the Act) 
• amending section 52(6) of the Act which enables the Commissioner to impose a penalty of 
six months’ imprisonment for failure to comply with a notice to produce documents or 
give information so as to ensure that penalties are proportional to the gravity of any 
offence84 
Equal remuneration  
The Committee has expressed concerns that the move away from award regulation to 
workplace-based regulation in the setting of wages, and more specifically the advent of 
individual workplace agreements (AWAs), is associated with the ‘lack of recent progress in 
narrowing the pay gap between men and women.’ Given the ‘considerable growth in the use 
of AWAs including in female-dominated sectors’, the Committee asked the government to 
provide detailed information on the wages and benefits negotiated under these agreements, 
including with regard to family-friendly provisions, disaggregated by sex and sector. The 
government was also requested to include detailed information on the AWAs’ practical 
impact on the existing remuneration gap between men and women workers.85 
                                                 
82.  For a discussion of these terms, see McCrystal, ibid., p. 200. 
83.  For more information on the penalties applicable, see McCrystal, ibid. 
84.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No 87), op. cit. 
85.  ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 
(No. 100) Australia (ratification: 1974) Published: 2007, www.ilo.org/ilolex , accessed 
20/9/2007. 
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Future directions 
Use of the external affairs power 
Creighton and Stewart have argued that ratification of appropriate ILO conventions, 
combined with use of the external affairs power of the Constitution, could provide the basis 
for a national workplace relations system. While noting that ILO standards do not deal with 
many issues that may merit legislative intervention, they suggest that such an approach could 
provide a system that protected minimum employment rights and conditions, including 
through legislated national minimum standards.86 One of the advantages of use of the 
external affairs power would be that it could achieve a uniform, national basis for protecting 
minimum labour standards.87 The current constitutional basis for the Workplace Relations 
Act (which is based largely on the corporations power, and a mix of other powers) is not able 
to achieve 100 per cent coverage in the absence of a referral of power by the 88 States.   
                                                
Williams has also examined the potential for use of the external affairs power as the basis for 
a single national scheme for the regulation of workplace relations in Australia. While noting 
the considerable potential of the power to enable Commonwealth legislation, Williams 
identifies a number of limitations, including: 
… the power can only be used to the extent that a government is willing to implement 
policies that are consistent with International Labour Organisation and other international 
conventions. 89 
Further, in order to be held valid by the High Court under the external affairs power: 
… a law must be ‘reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to 
implementing the treaty’. Problems arise, for example, if the legislation exceeds what is 
reasonably required to satisfy Australia’s obligations under the Convention; perhaps if the 
legislation does not comply with all the obligations of the treaty or if the treaty expresses 
some vague goal or ideal rather than prescribing a more specific course of action to be taken 
by signatory states.90 
 
86.  Creighton and Stewart, op. cit, pp. 78–83. 
87.  ibid. 
88.  Federal Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, the Hon. Peter 
Reith MP, Breaking the Gridlock: Towards a Simpler National Workplace Relations System, 
Discussion Paper 1: The Case for Change, Appendix D: Potential changes in coverage of 
workplace employees under a new federal system, Canberra, 2000. 
89.  G. Williams, ‘The Constitution and a national industrial relations regime’, Deakin Law Review, 
10(2), p. 502.  
90.  ibid., p. 503. 
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An example of the difficulties created where provisions of ILO conventions are not explicit, 
is provided by reference to the right to strike. In Victoria v Commonwealth91, the High Court 
found the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to be an 
appropriate source of legislative authority to enact provisions supporting lawful industrial 
action during bargaining periods, because it specifically refers to a right of strike, whereas the 
relevant ILO convention does not.  
This means that before any rights-based national system could be developed based on the 
external affairs power, its designers would be need to ensure that:  
• treaties were available to underpin the desired features of the system 
• the relevant treaties had been ratified by the government  
• the terms of the relevant treaties being relied upon were sufficiently definitive to provide a 
firm foundation for legislation. 
The Australian Labor Party’s workplace relations policy, Forward with Fairness, commits a 
Rudd Labor Government to achieve a ‘uniform national industrial relations system’, and 
states that it would ‘rely on all of the Constitutional powers available to it’ to enact national 
industrial relations laws. However, the ALP policy also indicates that Labor will work 
cooperatively with the states to achieve such a system, and that a national system could be 
achieved by state governments referring powers or by ‘other forms of cooperation and 
harmonisation.’92  The policy leaves open a range of options for implementation, but does not 
preclude reliance on the external affairs power. As a minimum, it is likely that equal pay, 
parental leave and termination of employment will remain primarily underpinned by the 
external affairs power. 
Other parties have proposed models influenced by international labour standards or have 
raised the prospect of possible use of the external affairs power as the basis for a national 
approach. For example, during 2006, the ACTU undertook a major study with a view to 
developing a new system of collective bargaining in Australia that would balance the need for 
social justice, democratic and cooperative industrial relations and economic prosperity. The 
working group recommended a rights-based approach which was informed by the ILO’s 
fundamental conventions, but also by arrangements in a number of other countries, including 
the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada and New Zealand.93 In launching its report, the 
                                                 
91.  (1996) 187 CLR 416, pp. 545–546. 
92.  Australian Labor Party, Forward with fairness: Labor’s plan for fairer and more productive 
Australian workplaces, April 2007, http://www.alp.org.au/download/now/fwf_finala.pdf, 
accessed 25 November 2007. 
93.  ACTU, A Fair go at work: Collective bargaining for Australian workers, September 2006, 
http://www.actu.asn.au/AboutACTU/ACTUPublications/AFairGoAtWorkCollectiveBargaining
forAustralianWorkers.aspx , accessed 9/8/2007; and Cath Bowtell, Industrial Officer, ACTU, 
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ACTU did not comment on the possible use of particular constitutional powers to underpin 
the proposed model.94  
In September 2007, the New South Wales Government released an issues paper, as part of the 
consultation process for an inquiry into options for a new national industrial relations system. 
The issues paper identifies six options, one of which is a national minimum standards model 
using the external affairs power.95 
Future relations with the ILO 
The potential use of the external affairs power as the constitutional basis for a national 
workplace relations system is a separate, although related, issue to the continued relevance of 
the ILO and its international labour standards. In relation to the latter, none of the major, or 
minor, Australian political parties has suggested that Australia’s membership of the ILO 
should be withdrawn, or that Australia should cease to participate in the ILO, or cease to 
ratify and implement appropriate conventions. Indeed, as noted above, for almost all of the 
history of the ILO, Australia has played, and continues to play, an active role in the ILO’s 
activities, including standard setting. What then are the prospects for Australia’s future 
relations with the ILO? 
Should the Workplace Relations Act not be significantly amended following the 2007 
election, there is a real prospect of escalating criticism from the ILO’s supervisory bodies. 
Such criticism has implications for Australia’s standing and role within the ILO. It also has 
implications for Australia’s ability to influence its regional neighbours to improve the 
conditions of their workers and, in the longer term, move towards a more level playing field 
for international trade. 
The table at Appendix C extracts policy statements that relate to the areas of compliance 
concern noted above, and provides a preliminary view of the prospect that the Rudd Labor 
Government would reduce the ILO’s areas of concern. The workplace relations policies of 
the Australian Greens are also considered. It should be noted that it is not be possible to 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘The ACTU’s industrial relations policy: Why the union movement has moved to a rights based 
approach’, address to the Industrial Relations Society of the ACT, Canberra, 8 August 2007. 
94.  When the ACTU report was released in September 2006, the ACTU indicated that it was 
awaiting the outcome of the High Court’s consideration of the constitutional validity of the 
Work Choices Act before making a decision about an appropriate basis for its proposed system. 
In November 2006, the High Court handed down its decision in New South Wales v 
Commonwealth, [2006] HCA 52; 81 ALJR 34; 231 ALR 1. It upheld the Australian 
Parliament’s capacity to rely, in large part, on the corporations power of the Constitution to 
sustain its workplace relations legislation. 
95.  G. Williams, Inquiry into options for a new national industrial relations system: Issues paper, 
NSW Government, Office of Industrial Relations, September 2007. 
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comment on all areas of concern with any degree of certainty until further policy detail is 
provided.  
Analysis of the ALP’s workplace relations policy, Forward with Fairness, suggests that the 
ILO’s compliance concerns would be significantly reduced, but not eliminated, by 
implementation of ALP policy. The policy does not commit the Rudd Labor Government to 
implementing fundamental ILO conventions per se. However, Labor has committed to give 
effect to ‘important workplace rights that are essential to a functioning democracy’—and 
those listed in the policy broadly reflect the ILO’s fundamental principles and core standards. 
Further, the stated intention of the ALP policy is to better balance the need for workplace 
flexibility with the need for fairness in the workplace—an objective which is broadly in line 
with the ILO’s concern to ensure that economic progress is not achieved at the expense of 
fundamental workplace rights. As outlined at Appendix C, preliminary analysis suggests that 
implementation of the ALP’s policy commitments would address a number of the ILO’s 
concerns, particularly in relation to collective bargaining and equal remuneration for work of 
equal value. However, some concerns regarding limitations on trade unions’ rights to 
organise and to strike would appear to remain outstanding on the basis of the information 
available at the time of publication. 
The Australian Greens’ policy is underpinned by a more general commitment to implement 
international human rights obligations, including in relation to collective bargaining, freedom 
of association, collective action and equal remuneration. The Greens’ policy statements 
suggest that they will be attempting to exert pressure on the Rudd Government to address 
residual areas of ILO concern in relation to union rights to organise and to strike. 
Conclusion 
Core labour standards have been recognised as embodying fundamental human rights. This 
being the case, it is surprising that the concerns raised by the ILO’s supervisory bodies 
regarding compliance issues related to the Workplace Relations Act have received relatively 
limited attention in parliamentary and media debates in Australia over the last 10 years. To 
some extent this may reflect the cautious nature of the ILO’s approach, involving as it has, a 
process of dialogue, exchange of information and reports, and gradually escalating demands. 
Continuing rounds of direct requests, observations and responses over more than a decade, 
and the absence of conclusive findings, have not proved sufficient to exert powerful 
compliance pressure. No doubt other factors have also contributed to restrict the debate, 
including the length and complexity of the Workplace Relations Act, the length and 
complexity of the ILO’s observations and reports and limited understanding of its processes. 
These factors have tended to focus media coverage on the assertions of the major players, 
rather than to an analysis of the issues. 
The underlying rationale for the ILO’s cooperative approach is that membership of the 
organisation and ratification of conventions should signal a nation’s willingness to comply 
with the associated obligations. Therefore, where compliance issues arise, all that should be 
necessary is a cooperative dialogue between the ILO and the country concerned. However, 
the Australian experience suggests that where fundamental differences of opinion in the 
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interpretation and application of international labour standards occur between a nation and 
the ILO, the processes of dialogue may become extended. In this context, any ambiguities, 
lack of definition and exception provisions in the terms of the conventions, as well as 
complexities in legislative arrangements at the national level will enable ongoing argument. 
This, together with the ILO’s reluctance to escalate its supervisory processes until all avenues 
for dialogue have been exhausted, has allowed compliance issues to remain unresolved for 
long periods, limiting the protection which fundamental international standards might 
otherwise provide for workers.  
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Appendix A: Key steps in the development of core labour standards in 
the context of globalisation96 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, acceleration of the process of economic globalisation 
generated concerns within the trade union and civil rights movements for an international 
‘race to the bottom’ which would undermine the basic rights of labour. This led organised 
labour to urge the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to adopt a social clause97 that would 
link respect for workers’ rights to the right to engage in cross-border trade. However, this 
move was opposed by a coalition asserting that such a clause was a form of protectionism 
designed to deny under-developed nations the ability to compete on the basis of their low 
wages. The WTO’s refusal to adopt such a clause heightened the focus on the ILO and raised 
questions about its credibility as an organisation established to uphold the basic rights of 
labour. The adoption, in 1998, of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work marked a new step in the ILO’s approach and the basis for further a 98ction.  
                                                
The ILO response to globalisation developed in a number of key steps and was influenced by 
a number of key developments: 
• 1993.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) included a labour clause. 
The NAFTA Side Accord on Labour Cooperation made no reference to the ILO and 
international labour standards, but obliged signatories to the agreement to promote certain 
core labour principles—freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively and the 
 
96.  Economic globalization has been described as ‘the increasing integration of economies around 
the world, particularly through trade and financial flows.’ International Monetary Fund, 
Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#II  
 accessed 15/9/2007. While globalisation is not a new phenomenon, it has been given impetus 
by the removal of trade barriers, deregulation of capital controls, and the development of new 
communication technologies. 
97 The term ‘social clause’ refers to a clause attached to a multilateral trade agreement that obliges 
the signatory governments to respect the fundamental rights of workers, as set out in the ILO’s 
fundamental conventions. Should a nation not observe these rights, they could lose the benefits 
of the agreement or be subject to trade sanctions, such as the levying of special tariffs on goods 
produced in conditions violating the standards.  
98.  C. Nyland and R. Castle, ‘The ILO and the Australian contribution to the international labour 
standards debate’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 41(3), September 1999, p. 355 provide a 
more detailed analysis of the events and debates leading up to the Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work in 1998. Also see A. Frazer and C. Nyland, ‘In search of the 
middle way: the ILO, standard setting and globalisation’, Australian Journal of Labour Law, 
10(3), pp. 280–86; and ILO, K. Tapiola, Executive Director, International Labour Office, ‘Core 
labour standards and globalisation’, paper prepared for the meeting of the Asian Development 
bank, Manila, 1 July 2002. 
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prevention of occupational injuries and illness—subject to each party’s domestic 
legislation.99 
• June 1994.  The Director General of the ILO made the labour rights-trade issue the focus 
for his report to the ILO’s annual conference. The developing countries ended any 
discussion of a social clause in the trading system to link market access to the observance 
of key labour standards. The conference established a Committee on Legal Issues and 
International Standards. 
• The Committee on Legal Issues and International Standards began the development of a 
portfolio of proposals for new conventions and recommendations which it believed could 
generate law, rather than merely expressing good intentions and were appropriate areas for 
legal regulation. This prioritisation process aimed to overcome the issues associated with a 
plethora of instruments of limited impact. 
• 1994.  The Governing Body of the ILO established a Working Party on the Social 
Dimensions of the Liberalisation of International Trade (which was later renamed the 
Working Party on the Social Dimension of Globalisation). This body identified two 
essential conditions necessary to ensure that the economic benefits of globalisation were 
commensurate with the social benefits, that is 
– the universal recognition of basic rights to be honoured by nations engaging in 
international trade, and 
– the setting up of an institutional framework to encourage states to use the benefits from 
globalisation to promote social progress. 
• March 1995. The World Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen, 
determined the ILO Conventions that would form the content of its core labour standards 
and that these standards were also fundamental human rights. These conventions covered 
the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour, freedom of 
association, the right to collective bargaining, equal remuneration for work of equal value, 
and the elimination of any discrimination in employment and occupation.  
• 1996. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released a 
study which concluded that the respect of core labour standards did not have any negative 
consequences for the economies and trade of developing countries and does not undermine 
their competitive position.100 
                                                 
99.  N. Haworth and S. Hughes, ‘Trade and international labour standards: Issues and debates over a 
social clause’, Journal of Industrial Relations, 39(2), June 1997, p. 188. 
100. OECD, Trade, employment and labour standards: A study of core workers’ rights and international 
trade, Paris, 1996. 
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• December 1996. The Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in Singapore issued a Ministers’ 
communiqué which reaffirmed the commitment to international labour standards, declared 
the ILO the competent body to deal with those standards. It also stated that such standards 
should not be used for protectionist purposes and particularly not for denying the 
comparative advantage of developing countries from lower wages. 
• March 1997. A discussion paper presented to the Committee on Legal Issues and 
International Standards identified options for promoting the core labour standards by 
either amending the ILO Constitution to enshrine the core principles, or developing a 
statement of fundamental rights in the form of a declaration adopted by the Conference. 
Such a declaration would become binding on member states through its embodiment of 
principles considered to be inherent in membership of the ILO. 
• June 1998.  The ILO Conference adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work. 
• June 1999.  The Director General of the ILO proposed that the primary goal of the ILO in 
the period of global transition would be ‘to promote opportunities for women and men to 
obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human 
dignity.’ Decent work was seen to be reliant on four strategic objectives (different from 
the four core labour standards)—that is, the promotion of rights at work, employment, 
social protection, and social dialogue,101 as well as respect for international labour 
standards. The concept of decent work recognises that work is not just about an 
employment contract, but a vital source of personal dignity and self-worth, as well as 
individual, family and community stability.102  
• 1999.  The Global Compact, which was proposed to the international business community 
by the Secretary-General of the UN in Davos, adopted the four categories of the 1998 ILO 
declaration as its labour principles. 
• 2000. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed at the 
European Council at Nice on 7 December 2000, included seven chapters covering 
fundamental rights relating to dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity, citizenship and justice. 
Of particular interest to employment and industrial relations, are provisions on protection 
of personal data (Article 8), freedom of association (Article 12), freedom to choose an 
occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15), non-discrimination (Article 21), 
equality between women and men (Article 23), workers’ right to information and 
consultation within the undertaking (Article 27), right of collective bargaining and 
collective action (Article 28), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30), 
fair and just working conditions (Article 31), prohibition of child labour and protection of 
                                                 
101.  That is, dialogue between the social partners—government, employers and workers. 
102. ILO, Report of the Director General: Decent Work, International Labour Conference, 87th 
Session, Geneva, June 1999, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/rep-
i.htm, accessed 14/9/2007. 
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young people at work (Article 32) and reconciliation of family and professional life 
(Article 33).103 
• 2000. The OECD published a new study, International Trade and Core Labour Standards, 
which reaffirmed the main findings of the OECD’s 1996 study. Amongst the study’s 
tentative conclusions was that ‘countries which strengthen their core labour standards can 
increase economic growth and efficiency by raising skill levels in the work force and by 
creating an environment which encourages innovation and higher productivity.’ 104 
• November 2001.  The Governing Body of the ILO established the World Commission on 
the Social Dimension of Globalisation. 
• 2002. A 2002 study on core labour standards and foreign direct investment (FDI) found 
that the negative effect of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights on FDI 
through labour costs is offset by other positive effects, such as greater political and social 
stability.105 
• 2003. A study by the ILO Institute found that freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights and democracy enhance export competitiveness.106 
• February 2004.  The World Commission released its report, A fair globalisation: Creating 
opportunities for all, setting out recommendations for making ‘decent work a global goal.’ 
Amongst other things, the Commission recommended that countries develop stronger 
policies to cope with the social strains of globalisation and proposed that a certain 
minimum level of social protection needs to be accepted as part of a socio-economic floor 
for the global economy. The main components of that floor were: 
– Fundamental rights at work and other civil and political liberties 
– Employment policies that combat exclusion from the labour market, and 
                                                 
103. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, ‘Fundamental 
rights’, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/fundamentalrig
hts.htm accessed 15/9/2007. 
104.  OECD, ‘Policy brief: International trade and core labour standards’, www.oecd.org accessed 
7/9/2007; and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International trade 
and core labour standards, Paris, 2000, p. 15. 
105. D. Kucera: ‘Effects of labor standards on labor costs and FDI flows’, Chapter 6, in H. Corbet 
and J. Bhagwati (eds.): Labor standards in an integrating world economy, Washington, DC, 
Cordell Hull Institute, 2002. 
106. D. Kucera and R. Sarna: International trade and freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights: A bilateral gravity model, International Labour Office, 2003. 
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– Social protection policies to ensure that all members of society enjoy a basic level of 
security in terms of income, health and other aspects of well-being.107 
• February 2007. A joint study undertaken by the International Labour Office and the 
Secretariat of the World Trade Organisation examined the connections between trade, 
labour and social policies.108 
• June 2007.  The Group of Eight (G8)109 summit meeting in Germany supported the ILO’s 
Decent Work Agenda as central to globalisation with social progress. The G8 committed 
to include decent work and respect the ILO’s core labour standards in their bilateral trade 
agreements, recalling that labour and social standards should not be used for protectionist 
purposes.110 
• July 2007.  The UN Economic and Social Council stated its strong support for fair 
globalization and the need to translate growth into reduction of poverty through full and 
productive employment and decent work.111 
                                                 
107.  International Labour Office, A fair globalisation: the role of the ILO, report of the Director 
General on the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, Geneva, 
International Labour Conference, 92nd Session, 2004. 
108.  International Labour Office and the Secretariat of the World Trade Organisation, Trade and 
employment: Challenges for policy research, a joint ILO/WTO Secretariat study, Geneva, 
February 2007. 
109.  The Group of Eight is an international forum for the governments of Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
110.  See ILO Press Releases, ‘ILO welcomes G8 support for decent work as central to globalization 
with social progress’, 
 http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Press_releases/lang-
-en/WCMS_082902. accessed 15/9/2007. 
111. Ministerial declaration of the 2007 high-level segment of ECOSOC as adopted on 10 July 
2007, http://www.un.org/ecosoc/docs/pdfs/Revised_Ministerial_declaration.pdf. accessed 
20/10/2007. 
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Appendix B: A Brief Summary of the Fundamental Conventions112 
The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour (Conventions Nos. 29 
and 105) 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) 
This fundamental convention prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labour, which is 
defined as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any 
penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.’ Exceptions are 
provided for work required by compulsory military service, normal civic obligations, as a 
consequence of a conviction in a court of law (provided that the work or service in question is 
carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and that the person 
carrying it out is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or 
associations), in cases of emergency and for minor communal services performed by the 
members of a community in the direct interest of the community.  
The convention also requires that the illegal extraction of forced or compulsory labour is 
punishable as a penal offence and that ratifying states ensure that the relevant penalties 
imposed by law are adequate and strictly enforced.  
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) 
This fundamental convention prohibits forced or compulsory labour as a means of political 
coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views 
ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system; as a method of 
mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development; as a means of labour 
discipline; as a punishment for having participated in strikes; and as a means of racial, social, 
national or religious discrimination. 
The abolition of child labour (Conventions Nos. 138 and 182) 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) 
This fundamental convention sets the general minimum age for admission to employment or 
work at not less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, in any case, not less 
than 15 years (13 for light work). The minimum age for hazardous work is set at 18 (16 under 
                                                 
112.  ILO, ‘Selected ILS by Subject’,  
 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/subject/index.htm. Accessed 14/9/2007. The 
full text of these and other ILO conventions is available from the ILOLEX database on the 
ILO’s website, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/index.htm. Accessed 14/9/2007. For a more 
detailed outline of the core standards, see B. Creighton, ‘The ILO and the protection of 
fundamental human rights in Australia’, Melbourne University Law Review, 22(2), August 
1998, pp. 245–254. 
47 
The International Labour Organisation’s core labour standards and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
 
certain strict conditions). It provides for the possibility of initially setting the general 
minimum age at 14 (12 for light work) where the economy and educational facilities are 
insufficiently developed. Examples of such light work may include work in a family 
business, on a family farm, after school, or in legitimate apprenticeship opportunities that are 
not hazardous and that do not affect a child’s attendance at school.  
 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) 
This fundamental convention defines as a child a person under 18 years of age. It requires 
ratifying states to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, including all forms of slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and 
serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of 
children for use in armed conflict; child prostitution and pornography; using children for 
illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs; and work which is 
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.  
The convention requires ratifying states to provide the necessary and appropriate direct 
assistance for the removal of children from the worst forms of child labour and for their 
rehabilitation and social integration. It also requires states to ensure access to free basic 
education and, wherever possible and appropriate, vocational training for children removed 
from the worst forms of child labour.  
Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining (Conventions Nos. 87 and 98) 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
This fundamental convention sets forth the right for workers and employers to establish and 
join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation. Workers’ and 
employers’ organisations shall organise freely and not be liable to be dissolved or suspended 
by administrative authority and they shall have the right to establish and join federations and 
confederations, which may in turn affiliate with international organisations of workers and 
employers. Organisations should have full freedom to develop their own constitution and 
rules and their own programs of activities, provided that they respect the law of the land. The 
convention does not expressly include a right not to join an organisation or a right to strike. 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)  
This fundamental convention provides that workers shall enjoy adequate protection against 
acts of anti-union discrimination, including requirements that a worker not join a union or 
relinquish trade union membership for employment, or dismissal of a worker because of 
union membership or participation in union activities. Workers’ and employers’ organisations 
shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other, in particular 
the establishment of workers’ organisations under the domination of employers or employers’ 
organisations, or the support of workers’ organisations by financial or other means, with the 
object of placing such organisations under the control of employers or employers’ 
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organisations. The convention requires ratifying states to promote the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by voluntary collective bargaining, where necessary, by measures 
that are appropriate to national conditions.  The convention does not expressly include a right 
to strike. 
The elimination of any discrimination in employment and occupation and the 
recognition of equal remuneration for work of equal value (Conventions Nos. 100 
and 111) 
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) 
 This fundamental convention requires ratifying countries to ensure the application to all 
workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of 
equal value. The term ‘remuneration’ is broadly defined to include the ordinary, basic or 
minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments payable directly or indirectly, 
whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker’s 
employment.  
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) 
This fundamental convention defines discrimination as any distinction, exclusion or 
preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of 
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation. It requires ratifying states to declare 
and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national 
conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and 
occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in these fields. This includes 
discrimination in relation to access to vocational training, access to employment and to 
particular occupations, and terms and conditions of employment.  
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Appendix C: Summary and preliminary assessment of ALP and Australian Greens Policy Statements 
relevant to areas of stated ILO concerns for the impact of the Workplace Relations Act on core labour 
standards 
Areas of ILO concern 
for core labour 
standards 
ALP Policy Statements: Forward 
with Fairness 
Is the ALP policy likely to 
reduce ILO concerns? 
Australian Greens Policy 
Statements 
Is the Greens’ 
policy likely to 
reduce ILO 
concerns? 
Failure to encourage and 
promote voluntary 
collective bargaining 
Primacy given to 
individual relations over 
collective relations 
 
Labor has committed to give effect to 
‘important workplace rights that are 
essential to a functioning democracy’, 
including: 
• collective bargaining 
• freedom of association 
• the right to representation, 
information and consultation in the 
workplace 
• protection against unfair treatment, 
and 
• freedom from discrimination. 
 
Labor policy states that the law will 
protect the right to bargain collectively, 
take protected industrial action or rely 
on the benefits of a collective bargain. 
At the commencement of bargaining, 
employers will be obliged to inform 
employees to be covered by the 
agreement of their right to choose to be 
represented in bargaining. 
All bargaining participants will be 
Yes. The major emphasis is on 
collective bargaining, rather than 
individual agreement making. 
Good faith bargaining 
obligations will be legislated.  
No disadvantage test  to be 
reintroduced. 
 
Some concerns may remain in 
the transition period and in 
relation to non-union bargaining. 
The extent of remaining concerns 
will depend on the 
implementation detail. However, 
it is likely that the Work Choices 
amendment which specified that 
offering an ‘AWA or nothing’ 
does not amount to duress will be 
removed and not applied to 
transitional individual 
agreements (ITEAs). 
In-principle commitment given to 
implementing international human 
rights obligations, including collective 
bargaining. 
 
Stated goal is the promotion of 
collective agreements as the primary 
means of regulating employment 
 
Key underlying principle is the right 
to be a member of a union, to bargain 
collectively, collectively to withhold 
labour and collectively organise in the 
workplace is essential to achieving a 
sustainable and democratic future.  
 
Committed to ensure that workplace 
and union-led bargaining is the 
primary tool for obtaining industrial 
outcomes by putting in place a 
sufficient threshold before any party 
can refer a dispute to conciliation and 
arbitration. 
 
Repeal the Coalition Government’s 
Work Choices legislation.  
Yes 
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Areas of ILO concern 
for core labour 
standards 
ALP Policy Statements: Forward 
with Fairness 
Is the ALP policy likely to 
reduce ILO concerns? 
Australian Greens Policy 
Statements 
Is the Greens’ 
policy likely to 
reduce ILO 
concerns? 
obliged to bargain in good faith. 
The legislation will support collective 
enterprise bargaining regardless of 
whether employees choose to negotiate 
through a union or without a union.  
A non-union collective agreement will 
be possible that has no union input, 
including at the approval stage. 
Fair Work Australia will consider 
whether the collective agreement meets 
the safety net. 
All collective agreements will be 
required to contain a flexibility clause to 
enable individual arrangements. 
However, when approving a collective 
agreement, Fair Work Australia must 
consider the scope of such a clause to 
ensure: it provides for ‘genuinely agreed 
individual flexibilities’; the collective 
agreement ‘as a whole’ is ‘better off 
than the relevant award’; and the 
individual employee cannot be 
disadvantaged with respect to the 
collective agreement by entering into an 
individual flexibility arrangement. 
 
Abolish Australian Workplace  
Agreements. 
 
Require employers to enter into  
collective agreements with their  
workforce. 
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Areas of ILO concern 
for core labour 
standards 
ALP Policy Statements: Forward 
with Fairness 
Is the ALP policy likely to 
reduce ILO concerns? 
Australian Greens Policy 
Statements 
Is the Greens’ 
policy likely to 
reduce ILO 
concerns? 
 
Transitional arrangements: 
Existing AWAs will continue to operate 
for their full term. 
New individual agreements (ITEAs) are 
possible during a finite transition period 
in defined circumstances, but must not 
disadvantage the employee against a 
collective agreement applying to the 
work. 
During the transitional period, awards 
and collective agreements will not be 
able to override an AWA or ITEA while 
those agreements remain in operation. 
Following the transition period, AWAs 
and statutory individual contracts will 
not be provided. 
Employers and employees will be 
assisted to bargain collectively. 
Greenfield agreements Where an employer commences a 
‘genuinely new business or undertaking’ 
and they have not engaged employees, 
the employer and a relevant union may 
bargain for a collective greenfield 
Yes. Employer greenfield 
agreements will be abolished. 
However, it is unclear whether 
the words ‘genuinely new 
business or undertaking’ suggest 
No specific mention, but Work 
Choices legislation to be repealed and 
in-principle commitment given to 
implementing international human 
rights obligations, including collective 
Yes. 
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Areas of ILO concern 
for core labour 
standards 
ALP Policy Statements: Forward 
with Fairness 
Is the ALP policy likely to 
reduce ILO concerns? 
Australian Greens Policy 
Statements 
Is the Greens’ 
policy likely to 
reduce ILO 
concerns? 
agreement for the new business. that provisions which extend the 
scope of greenfield agreements 
(for example, to new activities 
carried out by government 
authorities and new projects 
within an existing business) will 
be removed.  
bargaining. 
The potential for anti-
union discrimination 
Labor has committed to give effect to 
‘important workplace rights’, including: 
• freedom of association 
• protection against unfair treatment 
• freedom from discrimination. 
 
Employees will have the right to seek 
advice, assistance and representation 
from their union in the workplace, and 
workplace delegates will be able to 
represent their colleagues in the 
workplace. 
Working people will have the right to 
choose whether or not to be a member 
of a union. An employee’s choice will 
be respected. It will be prohibited for 
anyone, employer or union or anyone 
else to subject an employee to any 
pressure in making that choice. 
Some reduction of concerns is 
likely, but the extent of the 
difference between current 
arrangements and proposed 
system will depend on how the 
policy is implemented. 
Free, independent and democratic 
unions are an essential pillar of a civil 
society 
The right to be a member of a union, 
to bargain collectively, collectively to 
withhold labour and collectively 
organise in the workplace is essential 
to achieving a sustainable and 
democratic future.  
 
 
Yes 
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Areas of ILO concern 
for core labour 
standards 
ALP Policy Statements: Forward 
with Fairness 
Is the ALP policy likely to 
reduce ILO concerns? 
Australian Greens Policy 
Statements 
Is the Greens’ 
policy likely to 
reduce ILO 
concerns? 
Unfair dismissal protection will be 
extended. 
Limits on trade unions’ 
rights to organise 
 
Labor policy states that ‘Existing right 
of entry laws will be retained.’ It 
specifies: 
• Right of entry laws will allow union 
officials with a right of entry permit 
and proper notice to: 
– investigate breaches of industrial 
law, awards or agreements 
– hold discussions with employees 
who are members or who are 
eligible to be members of the 
union, or 
– investigate breaches of OHS law. 
 
Yes. While the existing right of 
entry provisions will be retained, 
the abolition of AWAs, and 
encouragement of collective 
bargaining, means that 
restrictions on entering 
workplaces are likely to be of 
lesser effect. 
Require employers to inform new and 
existing employees that they are 
entitled to join a union, and enable the 
provision of information about the 
unions responsible for the sector and 
industry. 
Restore unions’ right of entry to 
recruit members, inspect for and 
remedy breaches of occupational 
health and safety provisions, breaches 
of the Workplace Relations Act and 
relevant awards or agreements, and 
other activities relating to 
strengthening workers’ organisations.  
 
Remove the restrictions on the right of 
trade unionists to have their dues 
deducted from their wages directly. 
 
Yes 
Limits on the negotiation 
of multiple-business 
agreements and pattern 
bargaining 
 
Collective bargaining will be based on 
bargaining at the level of an ‘enterprise’ 
(that is, a single business or employer, 
group of related businesses operating as 
a single business or a discrete 
undertaking, site or project). 
Yes. Multiple-employer 
collective bargaining will be 
possible for some low paid 
industries. Broad definition of 
‘enterprise’ suggests some 
contraction of the concept of 
multiple-business agreements 
An industrial relations system that 
protects and enhances the rights of 
employees and workers by … 
facilitating industry wide collective 
agreements that are union negotiated 
and exceed the Award standards. 
Yes 
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Areas of ILO concern 
for core labour 
standards 
ALP Policy Statements: Forward 
with Fairness 
Is the ALP policy likely to 
reduce ILO concerns? 
Australian Greens Policy 
Statements 
Is the Greens’ 
policy likely to 
reduce ILO 
concerns? 
Pattern bargaining will continue to be 
unlawful, but multi-employer collective 
bargaining may be facilitated by Fair 
Work Australia for low paid employees 
or employees who have not historically 
had access to collective bargaining, 
‘such as in community services, 
cleaning and childcare industries.’ 
which applied under Work 
Choices.  
 
Limits on what may be 
included in a collective 
agreement 
 
Prohibited content provisions will be 
removed.  
 
Yes. No mention of limits. Work Choices 
legislation to be repealed and in 
principle commitment given to 
implementing international human 
rights obligations, including collective 
bargaining. 
Yes 
The extent of limitations 
on the right to strike. 
 
Existing secondary boycott provisions 
in the Trade Practices Act will be 
retained. 
Tough restrictions on industrial action 
will be kept, including mandatory secret 
ballots to be conducted in workplaces 
before protected industrial action can 
occur. 
Industrial action in pursuit of pattern 
bargaining is not allowed. 
Wording of the policy does not 
suggest change.   
Repeal provisions against legitimate 
union activity (such as sections 45D 
and 45E in the Trade Practices Act 
1974), and protect unions and workers 
against common law actions.  
 
Legislatively protect the right to 
strike, as recognised in International 
Labour Organization (ILO) 
Conventions No. 87 and No. 98, as a 
fundamental right of workers to 
promote and defend their economic 
and social interests.  
 
Yes 
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Areas of ILO concern 
for core labour 
standards 
ALP Policy Statements: Forward 
with Fairness 
Is the ALP policy likely to 
reduce ILO concerns? 
Australian Greens Policy 
Statements 
Is the Greens’ 
policy likely to 
reduce ILO 
concerns? 
Abolish the requirement for secret 
ballots before industrial action.  
Equal remuneration for 
work of equal value 
Labor has committed to give effect to 
‘important workplace rights’, including 
equal remuneration for work of equal 
value. 
Fair Work Australia will be able to 
commission and publish research on the 
effect of minimum wage variations on 
equity. It will also be able to ‘conduct 
enquiries and may recommend 
adjustment to … national employment 
standards’. Fair Work Australia will 
also be able to adjust minimum wages 
and award conditions. 
Yes. In-principle commitment.  
The role given to Fair Work 
Australia suggests scope for 
major inquiries into pay equity 
and recommendations for 
adjustment to the minimum 
employment standards. 
 
Other aspects of the policy also 
have the potential to impact on 
this issue, for example: 
• strengthened safety net 
• 30% casual loading 
• multiple-employer bargaining 
for low paid industries such 
as community services, 
cleaning and childcare (which 
are all female dominated) 
• decreased emphasis on 
individual bargaining. 
 
Key goals are: equal access to paid 
work based on ability and irrespective 
of gender, age, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, marital or civil status, family 
responsibilities, political affiliation, 
union membership, disability or 
religion; and elimination of the gender 
pay gap. 
 
Establish a National Pay Equity 
Standard to help correct the gender 
pay gap.  
 
Provide industrial tribunals with full 
powers to make orders to give effect 
to gender pay equity, on a workforce, 
industry or workplace basis.  
 
Yes 
 
Sources:  Australian Labor Party, Forward with Fairness: Labor’s plan for fairer and more productive Australian workplaces, April 2007; and Forward with 
Fairness: Policy Implementation Plan, August 2007.  
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 Australian Greens, Policy, Employment and Industrial Relations, and Human Rights and Democracy, http://greens.org.au/election/policy, accessed 
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